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ABSTRACT 
The War on Terror is a fight between states and non-state actors.  In this 
struggle, raiding has emerged as an important tactic used to deny enemy safe 
haven, to kill and capture known terrorists, and to gain vital intelligence to 
relentlessly pursue terrorists worldwide.  Conducting raids is one method that 
coalition partners must utilize in order to defeat terrorist networks.  This thesis 
specifically explores: how, when, and where raids prove strategically useful; how 
different forces conduct raids; and which techniques achieve strategic gains via 
raids.  To pre-empt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist organizations from successfully 
waging their brand of warfare, it is likely that the United States and Coalition 
partners must continue to pursue raiding operations under certain situations and 
utilizing modern techniques. This thesis argues, through the study of the Indian 
Wars from 1800–1890, and law enforcement raiding techniques used against 
gangs in the United States, that utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the 
correct time and place under the appropriate circumstances can significantly 
disrupt or destroy networked terrorist organizations.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The War on Terror is a fight between states and non-state actors.  In this 
struggle, raiding has emerged as an important tactic used to deny enemy safe 
haven, to kill and capture known terrorists, and to gain vital intelligence to 
relentlessly pursue terrorists worldwide.  Conducting raids is one method that 
coalition partners must utilize in order to defeat terrorist networks.  This thesis 
specifically explores: how, when, and where raids prove strategically useful; how 
different forces conduct raids; and which techniques achieve strategic gains via 
raids.  To pre-empt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist organizations from successfully 
waging their brand of warfare, it is likely that the United States and Coalition 
partners must continue to pursue raiding operations under certain situations and 
utilizing modern techniques. This thesis argues, through the study of the Indian 
Wars from 1800–1890, and law enforcement raiding techniques used against 
gangs in the United States, that utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the 
correct time and place under the appropriate circumstances can significantly 
disrupt or destroy networked terrorist organizations.  The working assumption of 
this thesis is that the enemy is networked, and is not the typical bureaucratically 
organized conventional military foe.  The study concludes that raids conducted 
by specialized units can more accurately direct the use of violence and more 
completely gather evidence at targeted locations.  Furthermore, the 
psychological gains associated with raids may prove invaluable in winning the 
information war against terrorists.   
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This thesis examines the strategic utility of conducting raids to achieve 
strategic gains in the war on terrorism.  Conducting raids is one method that 
coalition partners must utilize in order to defeat terrorist networks.  This thesis 
specifically explores: how, when, and where raids prove strategically useful; how 
different forces conduct raids; and which techniques can be used to achieve 
strategic gains via raids. 
2. Scope and Purpose 
The purpose of this project is to identify the value of conducting special 
commando raids in order to achieve strategic gains against a networked enemy 
in the Global War on Terrorism.  It is intended to explore which kinds of raids are 
strategically useful, how different agencies conduct raids, and what techniques 
exist and can be used to achieve strategic results. 
Conducting raids has proven to be essential in multi-faced offensive war 
campaigns throughout history.  To pre-empt, prevent, and disrupt terrorist 
organizations from successfully waging their brand of warfare, it is likely that the 
United States and Coalition partners must continue to pursue raiding operations 
under certain situations and utilizing modern techniques. As this thesis will argue, 
utilizing the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place under the 
appropriate circumstances can significantly disrupt or destroy networked terrorist 
organizations. The working assumption of this thesis is that the enemy is 




foe.  Consequently, classic raiding techniques may or may not work.  Before 
determining this, however, one must first assemble, collate, and understand the 
techniques. 
3. Thesis Outline and Roadmap 
I first outline and examine the principles of raiding and describe how 
military raids are planned and executed in Chapter II.  In Chapter III, I examine 
lessons to be learned from the strategically significant raiding campaign 
conducted by Plains Indians in the American Southwest and in Northern Mexico 
from 1800–1890.  Chapter IV examines current Law Enforcement Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for conducting raids against street gangs 
and drug cartels in America.  The aim is to understand and draw lessons from 
these raid methodologies as well.  In the conclusion, I summarize some “best 
practices” lessons learned and make recommendations for current and future 
raids against terrorists. 
4. Research Methodology and Literature Review 
This thesis draws on several bodies of literature, the author’s first hand 
experiences participating in raids, and time spent observing the Salinas Police 
Department.  Thus far, no one has collated “best practices” for raids across 
various U.S. forces and the interagency, never mind when one considers other 
countries’ operational experiences (e.g., Israel, the UK, etc.).  The most 
significant limitation encountered in this research was the time available to 
conduct the study.  Another limitation of this study is that it utilizes only 
unclassified documents.  There may be classified TTPs and examples of 
innovative methods for conducting raids unavailable in the open source literature.  
I have therefore limited myself to a historical perspective, utilizing the Plains 
Indians case, as well as an alternative point of view provided by the law 
enforcement example. 
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Prior to writing this thesis, I deployed for approximately forty months in 
support of the GWOT with conventional and special operations units from 2001 
to 2007.  I have conducted operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan ranging from 
village assessments and community-building to high intensity raids, utilizing the 
most up-to-date technology and methods for finding, fixing, and finishing 
terrorists in unilateral Army, Joint Special Operations, as well as Coalition 
operations with indigenous forces.  One aim of this thesis is to explore raiding 
techniques that may be used in specific situations to help units like the ones to 
which I have been assigned.   The recommendations for future raiding practices 
contained within this document are not exhaustive or absolute in their nature.  
Some techniques will not work in some circumstances, and no silver bullet exists 
to guarantee success in the realm of tactics or strategy.  My earnest desire is to 
expand the academic discussion on raiding, and to help enable future 
commanders to keep all available options on the table when determining the best 
course of action for their unit against a specific foe, regardless of the theater 
location, political situation, or enemy composition.   My premise is that utilizing 
the appropriate raiding technique at the correct time and place under the 
appropriate circumstances will play a significant role in the disruption or 
destruction of networked terrorist organizations.  
5. Significant Findings of the Study 
a. On Raiding 
Raids to deny terrorists sanctuary are a critical aspect of disrupting 
their operations worldwide.  The United States should exploit successful raids in 
the information domain by maximizing the strategic gain won by each operation.  
The continued ability and national will to conduct audacious, long-range raids will 
be especially important as the open conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan dissipate, 
and the United States returns to “peacetime” political conditions.  
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b. Lessons from the Indian Raids 
We should always look to historical cases to find ways to improve 
our current techniques.  It may be necessary to kill a large number of one’s 
enemy in order to defeat his will to fight.  Raiding involves the extremely accurate 
and discriminating use of force that delegates to the commando the responsibility 
to make life or death decisions on a person-by-person basis at the very last 
second, which serves to minimize the likelihood of collateral damage.  It is also 
important to treat civilians as well as captured enemy personnel with humanity.  
Taking family members captive, as the Plains Indians did so frequently, may be a 
logical and humane way to force terrorists to surrender (while this method may 
be called into question by current international laws of war).  Finally, the ruthless 
cavalry techniques used against the Indians may be justified in some cases when 
it is required to kill your enemy and defeat his way of life in order to preserve your 
own.   
c. Lessons from Law Enforcement Raids 
Law enforcement raids provide an example of methods that should 
be considered for use in military applications against terrorists.  Incorporating law 
enforcement investigation methods may prove beneficial to raid planners in 
military organizations, as could using police-style entry methods.  Of particular 
use may be riot control devices such as tear gas to increase the probability of 
peacefully negotiating an end to standoffs between military forces and 
surrounded terrorists. Lastly, the historic and ongoing criticism of how raids are 
conducted on American soil and the police methods developed to allay critics’ 
concerns should be taken into consideration by the military when it finds itself in 
similar situations. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Strategy 
Colin S. Gray’s works, Explorations in Strategy and Modern Strategy, offer 
very useful overviews of military strategy.   In Explorations of Strategy, Gray 
addresses strategic utility of special operations, air power, and sea power in 
extreme detail, while he covers strategy with respect to conflict type in Modern 
Strategy.  Although he does not cover raiding as a strategy in itself, he does 
comment directly on the role special operations play in conducting effective raids 
and the role that small forces can have on the outcome of entire conflicts.  Also 
of significance is B.H. Liddell Hart’s work, Strategy. 
2. Doctrine 
The most significant doctrinal publication I found with regard to raiding is 
the United States Marine Corps Field Manual 7–32 entitled Raid Operations.  
This publication covers in complete detail the planning process for military raids, 
and it actually goes into far more detail than Army manuals that I have used for 
years.  Significant documents that outline the United States doctrine for raids are 
FM 3–21.8 The Infantry Rifle Squad and Platoon, FM 3–21.10 The Infantry Rifle 
Company, and SH 21–76 The Ranger Handbook.  Additional tactical guidance on 
raiding is available in FM 7–85 Ranger Operations.  With the exception of the 
Ranger manuals, one cannot help but be disappointed with the lack of specific 
directions given for planning and conducting raids in these documents. 
3. History 
For an overview of raiding throughout the ages, From Troy to Entebbe, 
edited by John Arquilla provides excellent snapshots into the uses of raids during 
very different periods of history.  Beginning with the use of the Trojan horse, the 
book covers raiding techniques in short articles beginning with those used  
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against pirates before the United States Navy existed and ending with the 
deceptive, modern, long range raid at Entebbe conducted by the Israeli Defense 
Forces to rescue fellow citizens held hostage in Uganda. 
World War II commando raids are covered quite thoroughly in the form of 
six case studies in Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 
Theory and Practice, by William H. McRaven.  The cases are representative of 
both the European and Pacific theaters of operation, from both the Allied and the 
Axis perspectives.  While there is a voluminous literature about World War II 
raids, I felt the nature of these raids (state versus state) was not totally consistent 
with the nature of the adversary the United States faces today (state versus non-
state actor). 
Brian DeLay in War of a Thousand Deserts thoroughly covers the history 
of Indian raiding on the Southern Plains.  His thesis is that Comanche raids 
against the northern Mexican territories from 1800 through 1840 paved the way 
for the United States to defeat Mexico easily when the U.S. invaded in 1847.   
The U.S. acquisition of northern Mexican states could even be viewed as a 
neighborly act that lessened the suffering of Mexicans at the hands of Apache, 
Comanche, Kiowa, and Navajo raiders.  Because so much of the literature on the 
raiding culture of the Southern Plains tribes uses the same few sources, I turned 
to Paul I. Wellman’s The Indian Wars of the West, which appears the most 
rigorous as it is based mostly on original sources and first person accounts.  The 
initial edition was published in 1934, so it stands to reason that Wellman had 
access to people who participated in the Indian Wars, or at least knew of them 
first hand.  I believe the Indian wars offer an underutilized wealth of information 
concerning how governments should handle outlaw groups.  Additionally, if one 
looks at the significant problem posed by ungoverned or under-governed states 
as sanctuaries for terrorism, then it may be wise to uncover more lessons from 
Mexico’s, Texas’s, and the United States’ struggles with the Plains Indians. 
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4. Law Enforcement and Gangs 
Paul T. Mahoney explains law enforcement raiding doctrine in Narcotics 
Investigation Techniques.  This book serves as a text for police investigators as it 
describes an assortment of drug related cases and scenarios.  His doctrinal 
explanation of raids is congruent with the information I received in my interview 
with SWAT Commander Dino Bardoni of the Salinas, California Police 
Department, as well as what I learned from riding along with some of 
Commander Bardoni’s SWAT officers on duty.  Other law enforcement raiding 
documents include the SWAT Operational Guidelines and Standardized Training 
Recommendations published by the California Peace Officer Standards and 
Training Commission.  One interesting critical analysis of law enforcement 
raiding that is referenced by most recent critics in newspapers and other 
periodicals is Radley Balko’s monograph Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police 
Raids in America.    
For gang-related material, I turned to some government sources as well 
as some published documents meant for the criminal justice community.  Gangs: 
An Individual and Group Perspective by Kimberly Tobin provides an overview of 
most gang-related topics.  She covers definitions, explanations of why and how 
gangs develop, why people join, how they operate and, among other things, how 
to prevent and intervene in gang problems.  In Contemporary Gangs: An 
Organizational Analysis, Deborah Lamm Weisel identifies formal organizational 
features and confirms my suspicion that gangs bear many similarities to terrorist 
groups.  Although Weisel spends a lot of time trying to fit gangs into the 
bureaucratic organizational model, finally determining that they do not fit that 
organizational design, she draws the conclusion that the gangs she studied are 
successful, purposeful organizations that are highly adaptable and best 
described using Richard L. Daft’s organic-adaptive classification.  I believe even 
a modest look at the Global Salafi Jihad with regard to organizational analysis 
ties gangs and Al Qaida together as sharing a similar organizational structure or 
style. 
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The monograph Urban Street Gang Enforcement published by the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance provides a strategy outline for law enforcement agencies to 
adopt when developing their own tailored strategy to solve their local gang 
violence issues.  This is an excellent collaborative resource for techniques and 
skills.  The Florida Gang Reduction Strategy 2008–2012, produced by the Florida 
Attorney General’s Office, is an example of one state’s strategy that specifically 
targets gang problems through the multidisciplinary approach of 
Prevention/Intervention, Law Enforcement, and Rehabilitation/Re-entry.  Another 
valuable resource for gang information is the website www.streetgangs.com. 
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II. FUNDAMENTALS OF RAIDING 
A. DEFINITION OF RAIDING 
1. What is a Raid? 
Important to the complete understanding of the raiding concept is the 
definition of terms.  Most important is the definition of a raid itself. This chapter 
explains the terminology and major concepts required to understand raiding in 
the 21st century against terrorist enemies.   
The Marine Corps Field Manual on Raid Operations defines a raid as: 
 . . . an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration 
of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to 
destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon 
completion of the assigned mission.1   
Raids take many forms and have a variety of useful purposes, but the 
main point is that raids are small in scale, occur in enemy held territory (or at 
least in places where the enemy feels a certain level of comfort), and do not 
include the seizure and holding of land or structures for any lengthy period of 
time.  An expanded list of reasons to engage in raids follows, as the rationales for 
raids have evolved over time. There are some especially unique aims in the 
conduct of raids against terrorist enemies. 
2. Who Conducts Raids? 
“Raids may be conducted by aviation, artillery, infantry, reconnaissance, 
combat engineers, or any other group with skills and equipment suited for the 
mission.”2  This definition must be expanded by including missile launching 
                                            
1 Department of the Navy, FMFM 7–32 (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States 
Marine Corps, 1993). 1–1. 
2 Ibid. 
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assets, such as the Tomahawk Cruise Missile raids against Al Qaida training 
camps in Afghanistan in 1993, as well as the more popular and recent 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) raids conducted by Predators or other armed 
assets.  Although very similar to a pinpoint strike by a single aviation asset with 
smart-bomb technological assistance, there are numerous advantages, as well as 
limitations in conducting these UAV raids, which typically utilize maximum 
standoff and minimum personnel at the point of attack.  A key distinction between 
these various types of raiding forces is the capability to exploit the objective 
following the raid.  Only soldiers on the ground can truly exploit a raided 
objective, and therefore conduct the most effective and useful raids against 
terrorist enemies.  Additionally, soldiers on the ground can more judiciously 
control the level of violence on the target.  The pros and cons of putting assault 
troops on raid objectives will be the subject of subsequent discussion.  
B. PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING RAIDS 
When to conduct raids is a complex decision that involves strategic and 
tactical considerations.  As alluded to above, the ability of raids to achieve 
strategic gains utilizing small numbers of friendly forces requires uncommon 
planning, intelligence, and attention to detail in all facets of the operation.  The 
purpose and overall desired end state are the most important aspects of raiding, 
and must be clearly identified prior to the assignment of the mission to the 
executing unit.  “Awareness of the dual tactical-strategic dimensions of special 
operations allows one to see that what is necessary for success at one level may 
create problems at the other.”3  Assigning a purpose for a raid and then choosing 
an incompatible raiding force results in severely increased risk to the operation in 
the forms of risk to accomplishing the mission and risk to the forces involved.   
 
 
                                            
3 John Arquilla. From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996). xx. 
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And, in keeping with the duality of raiding a tactical success may result in 
strategic failure.  An extensive list of modern raid purposes and the forces and 
techniques likely to achieve those purposes follows. 
1. Purpose of the Raid—Gain Information 
One of the most important and long-lasting purposes of conducting raids is 
simply to gain information.  Although intelligence collection systems in the 
modern world are numerous, expensive, and relied upon daily for important 
strategic and tactical planning, there is no greater intelligence than that collected 
by trustworthy humans at the time and place of interest. 
Information is the domain of strategic competition in the modern battle with 
terrorists.  Al Qaida continually fights in the information sphere to gain an 
advantage over Western military and economic might, while sidestepping the 
diplomatic arena.  Raid operations are one way to collect the ground truth on 
those who seek to damage our national interests through terrorism. 
2. Purpose of the Raid—Destroy Enemy Personnel or 
Infrastructure 
A simple, but effective purpose of raiding is to destroy enemy personnel 
and equipment deemed important to the opposition’s organization.  This is the 
purpose most lay-people think of first when raiding is mentioned.  Many 
examples in history point to the effectiveness and perceived importance of 
executing this type of raid.  In 1944, Hitler entrusted the success of the German 
main effort Panzer attack across Belgium to a glider-borne raiding force whose 
mission was to destroy the enemy guns at Fort Eben Emael, which over-watched 






German glider-men defeated a significantly larger Belgian force, destroying ten of 
seventeen cannon positions, and rendering the fort useless to the Belgian 
defenses.4  
In today’s battle against terrorists, there remains a requirement to kill 
enemy combatants. But more important for strategic gains is the ability of 
international actors to win the information campaign that closely follows and 
amplifies the actions taken.  Killing key terrorist leaders, for instance, will ensure 
that those specific individuals will never again plan or conduct future operations.  
However, the impact of enemy propaganda regarding methods, collateral 
damage, violations of sovereignty, and other effects in association with the killing 
of key leaders may result in an overall negative gain for the raiding force.  
Capturing and bringing to justice terrorist perpetrators may prove far more 
effective in disrupting and defeating terrorist ideology, conversion, recruitment 
and ultimately terrorist actions, so long as the detainment, trial, and sentencing 
are perceived as fair and just.  Justice in detention, trial, and sentencing of 
terrorists is the subject of much debate and not within the scope of this work, but 
it does impact the execution and efficacy of raid operations. 
3. Purpose of the Raid—Psychological Gain 
A seldom-discussed, but extremely important purpose for conducting raids 
is to gain a psychological advantage over the enemy.5  The psychological aspect 
of raiding occurs in two parts—first, the direct psychological effect of the raiding 
actions themselves, and second, the use of raiding to deceive the enemy. 
                                            
4  William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995). 29, 55. 
5 FMFM7-32. 1-2. 
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a. Direct Psychological Gain—the Feeling of Surprise and 
Shock 
Raiding the enemy at a time and place when and where the enemy 
feels secure instills an overwhelming feeling of helplessness in those captured in 
the raid as well as in those who witnessed the raid.  Witnessing the raid may 
come in the form of hearing about the captures on the news, via local rumor 
networks, or even by seeing the action as it unfolds. 
Exploiting the shock of capture by conducting on-the-battlefield 
questioning of individuals on raided objectives may result in significant 
intelligence gains, as well as sow the seeds of distrust among the enemy.  
Terrorist networks operate utilizing very tight circles of trust.6  Leveraging the 
psychological impact of bringing the counter-terrorist fight close to those who are 
close to terrorists allows raiders to exploit friends, relatives, and neighbors to 
gain information about hard-core terrorists and their plans or capabilities. 
The psychological impact felt locally by enemy forces and their 
supporters is not only felt at the point of attack. A series or campaign of raids 
against an enemy may have an overarching psychological effect that defeats the 
will of the enemy to participate in further terrorist actions due to the likelihood of 
being targeted, captured, killed, or having family members detained by the 
raiding forces.  Furthermore, law-abiding citizens, aware of terrorist operations in 
their community, may feel comfortable informing authorities about the 
whereabouts of terrorists after citizens see multiple, effective, precision raids 
targeting terrorists in the neighborhood. 
 
                                            
6 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 178. 
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b. Deception as a Psychological Purpose of Raiding 
Deception is an active measure with the precise aim of causing 
one’s enemy to make mistakes.7  Furthermore, the methods of deception fall into 
five categories according to Jon Latimer, three of which involve raids or raiding 
forces as the primary instrument for execution. 
The first of the three categories consists of “displays that are 
deliberately intended to catch the enemy’s eye.” “These can be used to portray a 
unit that does not exist, to give the impression that there are powerful forces in 
an area where there are actually very few.”8  What better way is there to show a 
terrorist organization that extremely capable forces are watching and able to 
strike in their local area than by raiding?  Even if the capacity for governance and 
policing is small or non-existent in a specific area, well placed raids may deceive 
the enemy regarding the actual capability of the host nation or an interested 
outside power.  This concept of deception used as an economy of force 
application may bear fruit in the denial of sanctuary to the Al Qaida core in places 
like the Federal Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, for instance.   
The second category of deception to utilize raids is feint 
operations.9  The feint is a classic military strategic move that deceives the 
enemy about the particular composition, disposition, or general direction of the 
main attack. Applied to fighting terrorists around the world, media coverage, word 
of mouth reporting, and general hype that follow American raiding operations are 
perfect feints to distract Al Qaida and international scrutiny away from other U.S. 
and Coalition initiatives.  
The third category of deception involves demonstrations, which are 
similar to feints, but different because the force conducts a demonstration on a 
                                            
7 Jon Latimer, Deception in War (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2001). 1. 
8 Ibid., 72. 
9 Jon Latimer, Deception in War, 72. 
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front or in a location where the deceiving force has no intention of fighting.10  
Again, if we use the example of Al Qaida, its core is likely residing in Pakistan; a 
few well-placed demonstrations well inside Pakistan’s borders may signal to the 
AQ leadership that the United States will step up its targeting.  Ideally this will 
flush out AQ, causing the premature evacuation of relatively secure facilities by 
AQ leaders in Pakistan.  However, in reality, the U.S. may not intend to conduct 
full-scale terrorist clearance operations inside Pakistan. 
4. Purpose of the Raid—Harass the Enemy 
The main purpose of conducting harassment raids is to demoralize the 
enemy and instill a feeling of helplessness and hopelessness about defending 
his forces, headquarters, and logistics centers.11  Harassment raids may deny 
the enemy sanctuary in a general location or serve to stymie the opponent by 
humiliating him on his own turf.  Raids that unveil the enemy’s inability to protect 
his most prized possessions, locations, or leaders will have strategic impacts on 
that enemy’s ability to wage war.12 
a. Harass to Deny Sanctuary 
Raids conducted in neighborhoods or on houses where terrorists 
are known to live, where they visit, or where they have family ties denies that 
particular location to terrorist use.  Changing the methods and timing of raids is 
key to harassment as a form of area denial, so that the raiding force does not 
telegraph patterns of conduct to the enemy, resulting in the raiding force losing 
its surprise and effectiveness.  For instance, the raiding force may want to 
conduct some raids at night and some in daylight.  It would be well served to 
conduct some raids utilizing low-violence techniques, while other targets should 
be assaulted using explosive entry techniques followed by controlled demolition 
                                            
10 Jon Latimer, Deception in War, 72. 
11 FMFM 7-32. 1–2. 
12 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996). 178. 
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of the site to accomplish other strategic or tactical objectives, such as destroying 
the infrastructure that serves as key terrain for the enemy.  There are a multitude 
of methods to vary raiding techniques and some of these will be covered in 
subsequent sections. 
In summary, persistent harassment by an “all-knowing” force, that 
thereby advertises its limitless resources, will significantly influence the enemy’s 
capability to wage offensive operations, particularly if the enemy is kept on the 
defensive. 
b. Harass to Expose Enemy Vulnerability 
Raids can also be used to expose the weakness of an adversary.  
Colin Gray, for instance, cites an example from the 1968–1970 war of attrition 
between Israel and Egypt.  Israeli Defense Forces executed long-range raids 
inside Egypt.  Most significant was a raid on the Naj Hamadi transformer station 
and bridge, which represented a top-of-the-line facility for Egypt at the time, and 
symbolized Egypt’s economic and political might.  The attack on this source of 
pride humiliated Nasser’s government due to its military’s inability to secure such 
an important location 320 kilometers from the nearest border. Adding insult to 
injury was the fact that it took only small groups of IDF personnel to conduct the 
operation.  A mere fistful of “inferior” soldiers operating on the ground inside 
Egypt humiliated the Egyptians and their government, which resulted in an 
eventual strategic victory for Israel; Nasser, his population, and his military 
realized they could not defeat the Israelis.13 
Another example of exposing enemy vulnerability through the 
conduct of swift, long-range, and violent raids executed with the intent of 
humiliating an enemy was Al Qaida’s September 11, 2001 attacks in the United 
States.  With three successful suicide attacks (out of the four attempted), Al 
Qaida inflicted severe feelings of shame, guilt, and helplessness on Americans.  
                                            
13 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 178. 
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In a propaganda coup, these images and feelings were broadcast and re-
broadcast around the world.  Al Qaida did not completely achieve its desired 
effects, but America was temporarily paralyzed.  This temporary, but deeply 
emotional harassment of the United States may have served Al Qaida well with a 
short-term victory.  However, U.S. counter-raids against AQ may yet turn out to 
outweigh the strategic benefits of conducting the attacks in the first place.  From 
a strategic point of view, the raids conducted by a small force on the under-
prepared and unaware United States did have devastating effects on the country 
as a whole, yet the raids also served as a wake-up call so that the U.S. would not 
be taken unawares again in the future. 
5. Purpose of the Raid—Spoiling Effect 
Raiding can be used preemptively.  Covert raids, in particular, represent a 
politically sensitive offensive weapon for preventing terrorists from accomplishing 
their sinister plots.  Commandos are very capable when armed with specific, 
timely, and accurate intelligence.  Conducting raids to spoil enemy plans may 
also be the most politically useful strategy available since they obviate the need 
for major ground forces to occupy sovereign territory for a significant period.  This 
limits international scrutiny, preserving both national power as well as the safety 
of the raiding forces themselves.  
On 18 November 1976, elite Rhodesian counter-terrorist forces, the 
Selous Scouts, conducted a spoiling cross-border raid against the Soviet 
supported ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army) headquarters in 
Botswana.  The KGB supplied ZIPRA with several suitcase bombs with which to 
conduct terrorist attacks in Rhodesia. But, the Selous Scouts spoiled this plan by 
conducting an audacious raid deep into the terrorists’ sanctuary in Botswana.  
The Selous Scouts captured the bombs and then used several of the enemy 
devices to destroy the ZIPRA headquarters in Francistown.14  This is a vivid 
                                            
14 Bruce Hoffman and RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA., Commando Raids: 1946-1983. 
(Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1985). 52. 
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example of just how much can be accomplished through a raid when raiders can 
combine specific intelligence with unparalleled improvisation and sophistication.  
Not only can they deny the enemy the ability to conduct offensive terrorist 
actions, but can turn the tables on them, destroying terrorist infrastructure and 
personnel in a single, multifaceted operation.  
6. Purpose of the Raid—Recover / Rescue Personnel / Equipment 
Probably the most easily justified and popular type of raid is one 
conducted to free persons held against their will by political, military, or, more 
recently, terrorist captors.  Nineteen out of one hundred commando operations 
executed between 1946 and 1983 were rescue operations.15  Against hard-core 
terrorist enemies like Al Qaida, rescue operations must be conducted extremely 
quickly. Terrorists are unlike most hostage takers in that they are more ruthless 
and willing to conduct heinous acts like beheadings and other mutilations.  In 
most other cases, hostage takers do not want to draw attention or earn the ill-will 
of the world.  Instead they seek a ransom or that a series of relatively rational 
demands be met.  In many cases, terrorists brutally murder hostages before they 
can be located with a degree of certainty necessary for successful rescue 
operations.  Rescues are complex raids that require extreme intelligence, 
competence, control, daring, and capability for success. 
C. PRINCIPLES OF RAIDING 
1. McCraven’s Theory of Special Operations 
In his book Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: 
Theory and Practice, William McRaven identifies six principles of special 
operations: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.   
 
                                            
15 Bruce Hoffman and RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA., Commando Raids: 1946–1983, 
19. 
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McRaven derived his theory from case studies comprised of raids.  Given this, it 
seems safe to assume that these six principles are critical to any raid or raiding 
campaign, and to operations conducted against terrorists in particular. 
2. Hoffman’s Effectiveness of Commando Raids 
Bruce Hoffman, in a Rand study published in 1985, analyzes 100 cases of 
which he labels “commando raids” to determine the effectiveness of “clandestine 
military operations staged by small-size raiding parties during ostensibly 
peacetime situations, and their potential utility as a component of U.S. military 
policy for responding to terrorist attacks.”16  Hoffman considers the following six 
factors significant in determining the success or failure of any given raid: “the 
geographical distance between the raiding party’s staging area and its objective, 
the previous training of the raiders, the size of the raiding party, the method of 
transportation used, the objective of the raid, and the use of disguise and 
deception.”17  Boiling down these factors we get: geographical location, training, 
size of force, transportation method, purpose, and surprise.  
McRaven’s six principles and Hoffman’s six factors overlap to a significant 
degree.  As mentioned in most work regarding raids and raiding, achieving 
surprise is critically important, be it tactical, strategic or even doctrinal surprise.  
Hoffman’s explanation of the purpose for deception and disguise is to achieve 
surprise.  In fact, his highlighting the importance of choosing appropriate 
methods of transportation has to do with increasing probabilities that the raiding 
force achieves surprise at the raid location.  Similarly, he concludes that limiting 
raiding forces to between 15 and 50 members will enhance their ability to 
achieve surprise while still remaining a formidable fighting force.  When Hoffman 
emphasizes training and McRaven draws attention to the importance of repetition 
what they are underscoring is exactly what special operations forces try to 
                                            




achieve: the ability to execute previously rehearsed mission profiles on a 
constrained planning timeline in the name of surprise. The concept of having a 
well-trained, proficient, and rehearsed force is especially important to raiding 
forces, as both point out. Again too, Hoffman’s concept of geographic proximity 
relates back to surprise, as does McRaven’s treatment of good intelligence, since 
a solid intelligence estimate of any situation will feature the terrain and routes 
that will best support the attacking unit’s achievement of surprise. 
Surprise is critical in raiding against terrorist enemies because of the 
special character of this enemy.  Terrorists are not simply adversaries who desire 
to pursue the extension of politics through violence between national armies.  
Terrorists inflict serious harm on innocent people in an attempt to swiftly 
manipulate sovereign governments.  Surprising terrorists with raids in their 
“sanctuaries” is one way to pre-empt terrorist plots and is critical to preventing 
them from developing fully developed campaigns of mass destruction. 
Hoffman’s principles are useful for objectively determining the probability 
of raid success based on a few distinct measurable variables.  McRaven’s 
principles are important for ensuring the relative superiority of special operations 
necessary to achieve success.  But, I believe a new principle of raiding is 
required when conducting a campaign of raids against terrorist enemies in the 








3. Principles of Raiding against Terrorist Enemies 
Taking into account the principles analyzed above, the common list that 







For raiding in the 21st century, we must also add perception.  Perception 
may be thought of in four ways. 
Perception is by definition the act of gaining insight, intuition, or 
knowledge, marked by discernment and understanding. 18  Incidentally, this word 
is derived from the Latin per and capere, or “to seize,” so I believe it has 
particular relevance in the context of raiding principles and is deeply rooted in a 
concept of winning the information campaign.  As B. H. Liddell Hart so eloquently 
states, “A good cause is a sword as well as armour.  Likewise, chivalry in war 
can be a most effective weapon in weakening the opponent’s will to resist, as 
well as augmenting moral strength.”19  How raids are perceived allows grand 
strategy to succeed so long as a force conducts raids for just purposes in an 
ethical manner and so long as the aftermath of operations are handled justly in 
the eyes of the watching public.  Raids hold meaning for four sets of people. 
There is the psychological message sent to or received enemy, friendly, and 
neutral witnesses; second are local perceptions about the justice of the raid in  
 
 
                                            
18 The American Heritage College Dictionary, ed. Costello, Robert B. et al., Third ed. 
(Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993). 1013–1014. 
19 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1967). 336. 
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terms of its purpose, the raiders conduct, and the raid’s outcomes. Third are 
perceptions at the national level.  Fourth are perceptions in the international 
arena. 
The psychological message sent to or received by the enemy, friendly, 
and neutral witnesses is a lesser-included purpose of every raid conducted for 
any of the major purposes outlined above.  No matter whether the raid is to 
destroy a ball-bearing factory or to rescue hostages held for months, one key 
aspect of raiding is the psychological impact of an outside force imposing its will 
upon an adversary.  The psychological message is likely felt most intensely by 
individuals who actually experience the raid first-hand; however, larger audiences 
may be influenced in their future endeavors through their knowledge of the 
raiding force’s previous and potential actions.  The advent of communications 
technology amplifies this final point as first-hand verbal, pictorial, and video 
accounts are shared rapidly. 
A small number of individuals develop and decide local perceptions about 
the justice of the raid in terms of its purpose, the raiders conduct, and the raid’s 
outcomes.  Personnel on or near the raid objective develop their understanding 
very quickly through observation and participation in the raid event.  Nosy 
neighbors stick their heads out of windows to observe the raiding force approach 
the objective, or concerned local leaders arrive at the raid scene to offer support 
or explanation for the people or items found on the objective.  These first-hand 
witnesses spread their impression of the raid and the raiding force’s conduct to 
everyone they encounter. This process of observation and reporting shapes 
rumors that develop about the raid. 
U.S. domestic attitudes about the raid develop more slowly, but can have 
a significant impact on whether it is considered a success or failure, with 
repercussions on subsequent raids.  The facets at the national level are similar to 
those of the local level.  However, in contrast to local reactions, the nation’s 
response / attitude to the raid or a series of raids may ebb and flow over a larger 
period of time.  Emotions at the national level can spike at different times rather 
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than run as high as they might close to the actual raided objective.  National 
attitudes about raiding may have such long term and far-reaching consequences 
as to influence national elections or affect support for military forces and 
governments in general. For example, the perception of mistreatment of terrorist 
detainees in suspected secret prisons caused a national uproar in the United 
States that left many citizens feeling uneasy about their government and its 
prosecution of a struggle many want to believe is just. 
The last point has to do with international perceptions. Countries, 
populations, governments, and individuals will draw their own conclusions about 
raiding campaigns, raiding behavior, and raiding methodologies.  The 
conclusions drawn about the long-term outcome of raids against a specific 
enemy will cause people to take action for or against the raiding force.  That 
ultimately, is what decides the success or failure of the raid. Finally, international 
judgements may represent the composite understanding of people in 
communities that are not necessarily bounded by geography—such as Arabs, 
Muslims, Jews or some other “networked” population.  
D. DEFINITIONS, BENEFITS, AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESSFUL 
AND FAILED RAIDING  
The literature does not generally define specific criteria for judging the 
success of a campaign conducted through raids or for judging particular raids 
against an objective set of criteria.  Raids are deemed successful in most cases if 
the operation achieves the mission assigned (or as conducted by the unit 
commander) while the raiding unit sustains minimal damage or casualties.  In 
many cases, raiding campaigns are considered successful depending on the 
number and type of enemy combatants versus the number and type of friendly 
forces killed or captured.  Unfortunately, these criteria reflect flawed thinking for 
raiding in the 21st century.  In the 21st century one must always be aware of 
grand strategy and consider perception about the raid or raiding campaign prior 
to judging it a success or failure.    
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Rather than operational success or failure, it is critical to evaluate gains or 
losses in the strategic realm. For example, the botched attempt to rescue 
American hostages in Iran was considered a major failure for Special Operations 
Forces and for this type of long range, cross border, international raid.  However, 
Bruce Hoffman refers repeatedly to Winston Churchill’s insistence that 
commando operations needed to be conducted during World War II in order to 
gain a psychological advantage with the English population.  Perhaps viewed 
from a different perspective the tactical failure at Desert One may have 
nonetheless accomplished several things.  First, Operation Eagle Claw provided 
hope to the American hostages in Iran that their country had not abandoned 
them.  Second, it boosted public awareness about the efforts that the Carter 
Administration was undertaking to free the hostages.  Third, it announced to the 
world that the United States possessed the power, will, and technical expertise to 
secretly mount such a complex operation.20 
On the other side of the coin here is the successful bombing raid 
supported by special operations reconnaissance teams, which killed Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaida in Iraq.  By all accounts, this was a 
successfully conducted raid that accomplished a long-standing American 
strategic goal—kill the terrorist leader in Iraq who was behind most of the 
heinous violence in the country.  Yet, as John Robb reports, another leader 
quickly replaced Zarqawi and most other authors have agreed that this single 
raid against the AQI leader did not defeat the insurgency in Iraq.21  So, even 
though many in the West viewed the raid positively because the media had long 
portrayed Zarqawi as such an important figure for the enemy, yet, others have 
questioned the raid’s outcome since the enemy simply morphed and did not 
wither away.  But looking at it strategically, perhaps the raid did achieve a 
                                            
20 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 96–99. 
21 John Robb, Brave New War : The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization 
(Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2007). 113.  Also see The Gamble by Thomas Ricks for an 
analysis of the insurgency in Iraq from 2006–2008 and the United States strategy for defeating it. 
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positive outcome for the U.S. and the Iraqi Governments by forcing AQI to accept 
a sub-par leader whose fear of discovery by American raiders pushed him further 
into the underworld.  By reducing leadership effectiveness overall, the raid may 
have inflicted lasting damage on the organization as a whole. 
E. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RAIDS 
Warfare in general contains many grey areas that make it difficult to judge 
whether any one act or operation is a total success or a total failure.  War is 
expensive on all levels; people die, populations are displaced, and infrastructure 
is destroyed.  Raiding, however, is quite different from major conventional 
combat operations that pollute the modern vision of warfare.  In the Global War 
on Terrorism, armies do not establish front lines and rear areas.  No longer do 
carpet bombing campaigns target factories producing the enemy’s war machines.  
Through raiding, forces seek to operate with surgical precision in conditions that 
demand nothing less.  Because adversaries remain intent on causing harm and 
have to be destroyed one has to wonder how else can we do this except through 
raiding?  Given the types of urban environments where most terrorist groups now 
operate, and the complexity of terrain and collusion of enemy and non-combatant 
populations, raids are the most tightly focused and least physically destructive 
operations possible. Raids enable commanders to utilize non-lethal or less-than-
lethal techniques in order to reduce injury to non-combatants.  The “in and out” 
nature of raids also match the limited nature of force friendly forces can 
effectively bring to bear on the enemy.22 
The unintended consequences of raids again reside in the realm of 
perceptions.  Today’s technologically advanced raiding force utilizes every asset 
available to minimize collateral damage while pursuing its objectives.  In many 
cases, raid objectives are seized and cleared without the firing of a single shot, 
and in some cases they are conducted at the invitation of local residents.  There 
                                            
22 Department of the Army, FM3–21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company (Washington D.C.: 
Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006). 12–2, 12–3. 
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are a variety of techniques available to today’s raider to tailor the amount of force 
to be applied at the specific objective, on a house-by-house or site-by-site basis. 
Raiding puts the most capable decision making apparatus (a well-trained, 
ethically minded, and mature human being) at the extreme point of decision-
making in order to apply the appropriate force at the appropriate time and place.  
No computer targeting device, analyst software, or decision-making process can 
match the speed, accuracy, or precision of the special operator’s brain.  
The unintended consequences of raiding can be significant, but the most 
important are death or injury of non-combatants and un-intended destruction of 
residential or community property.  These unintended consequences provide a 
sharp adversary with ample ammunition to mount an information campaign 
against the raiding foe.  Consequently, the raiding force must do everything 
possible to satisfy three criteria while planning and conducting raid operations in 
order to win the battle of perception regarding unintended consequences. First, 
the cause must be just–as mentioned earlier, justice in the reasons for war are 
the frontline defense against criticisms against the fighting.  Second, the conduct 
of the raid must be just. Applying the minimum amount of force required to 
accomplish the mission will ensure this criterion is met.  Lastly, the treatment of 
personnel—combatants and non-combatants alike—must be just from the point 
of capture through the detention process and, when applicable, through the trial 
and sentencing of terrorists.  Not all people will view these three criteria in the 
same way. Nor will less lethal force always succeed in accomplishing the aims of 
the raid.  In reality, the raiding force may well need to kill all or just certain people 
on an objective in order to accomplish its mission, but the degree to which the 
raiders apply violence with precision will redeem raiding as a humane, 
discretionary, highly specific, and effective application of violence when and 
where required. 
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III. NATIVE AMERICAN INDIAN RAIDING 
A. THE RAIDERS AND THE RAIDED FROM 1820–1900 
1. Development of Native American Raiders and Warrior Society 
Native American Indian interactions with citizens and armies on the 
American Plains and Southwest offer significant lessons regarding warfare, and 
raiding especially.  Entire populations of Comanche, Navajo, Kiowa, Apache, 
Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho and others formed their lives around a warrior code.  
After the release of Spanish horses onto the plains around 1700, these native 
tribes in America developed unmatched fighting and equestrian skills to emerge 
as superior nomadic warrior societies that preyed on the sedentary farming and 
ranching people of the surrounding areas through raiding.23  The Indians of the 
plains made their living from hunting, herding, roaming over large land areas, and 
raiding their neighbors. 
The grasslands of the prairie and the deserts of the southwest were 
largely unfit for permanent settlements, but the Indians thrived by living a 
nomadic hunting lifestyle following the enormous buffalo herds.  Indians met their 
needs through the complete utilization of the killed animals.  Meat, hides, fur, 
bones, and organs—nearly every piece of the buffalo had a purpose for the 
Indian people of the plains.24  Soon, however, Indians discovered that they could 
live a more fulfilled lifestyle by raiding and stealing the immense horse-wealth 
and other possessions belonging to their neighbors to the south. 
Navajo Indians in present day Mexico were the first to secure horses from 
Spanish settlers after the Great Pueblo Revolt of 1690 that caused the Spanish 
                                            
23 The Great Indian Wars 1540–1890, DVD, directed by Ron Meyer BCI, A Navarre 
Corporation Company, 2005) Disk 1. 
24 Ibid. 
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to abandon their herds.25  Navajos utilized these horses to develop mobile attack 
parties with which they plundered additional horses and goods from Spanish 
settlements.  The Navajos then tended their own herds and became expert horse 
breeders over time.26   
From birth, boys learned and women reinforced the warrior culture.  
Women handcrafted amulets while pregnant for their boys to wear for protection 
as young men and warriors.  Boys developed warrior skills by playing games 
involving weapons and engaging in friendly competitions that simulated hand to 
hand fighting.  Indian youth ran and swam to develop unmatched strength and 
endurance. Shooting both native weapons and newly acquired rifles for skill and 
survival rounded out the boys’ education as future warriors.  The conglomeration 
of special skills and ferocity developed by living a nomadic hunting lifestyle 
served Indians well in warfare as the many tribes on the Plains frequently fought 
wars between themselves.  Boys became warriors around age 14, and began 
leading their own raiding parties as early as age 17.27 
Warrior societies actually made a sort of game out of plains warfare.  The 
name of the game was “counting coup” and the outcome of scoring points was 
prestige, honor, and leadership.  One counted coup through acts of bravery 
against an enemy.  The most exhilarating and highly regarded action was to 
actually move in and touch a living, fighting enemy with one’s own hands.  Other 
ways to count coup were by scalping or otherwise retrieving proof of enemies 
killed at longer range.  Indian warriors become respected chiefs and actually led 
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success on raids.  Indian society built a quite effective method to ensure that 
leaders were skilled, capable, and competent, with an Indian chief’s power base 
built on his success in battle.28 
Comanche women—to cite just one example—policed the warrior society 
through either the adoration or disdain they directed at warrior men after they 
returned from the warpath.  Young women were reminded to “satisfy all the 
desires of those who distinguish themselves in battle, and not to forget to heap 
scorn and opprobrium on those who show cowardice.”29 Additionally, the young 
women conducted celebratory dancing and chanting when they received news of 
their warriors’ success. Kiowa women added stripes or other adornments to their 
leggings representing the number of scalps or coups won by relatives to display 
pride in their warrior’s achievements.  The women, and even the children, 
chastised those who performed poorly in battle or showed cowardice in the face 
of the enemy. Men whose cowardly acts or poor fighting skills resulted in the 
death of honored warriors had their belongings broken and burned while the 
children hurled insults and taunts.30  In this effective application of social 
pressure, only the most tactically savvy and skilled fighters received the honor, 
adoration, and social approval required to advance in military rank to lead 
expeditions that put Indian men in harm’s way. 
Indian fighters used small unit tactics to achieve overwhelming success.  
Raids and ambushes were their operations of choice.  In a classic ambush tactic, 
the Sioux and Cheyenne totally annihilated a cavalry troop of 81 men in a battle 
known as the Fetterman Massacre on December 21, 1866, near Fort Phil Kearny 
in present day Wyoming.  A small band of ten hand- picked braves taunted the 
cavalry troop under Captain Fetterman’s command into pursuing them over 
Lodge Trail Ridge and down the other side.  A large Indian force awaited the 
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eager cavalry soldiers and commenced to destroy them to the last man with 
mostly bows, arrows, lances, and clubs.31  Such one sided ambushes appear 
repeatedly in the literature on Indian wars in America. 
Raiding occurred throughout the 1800s as a method for extracting wealth 
from those who held it, as well as to exact revenge on enemies.  Usually 
consisting of a small band of from four to forty Indians, raiding parties were led by 
the “pipeholder” who was expected to know the routes, landmarks, and target 
locations.  Using scouts to ride ahead of the main body of attackers, Indians 
traveled quickly and quietly to raid objectives.  Approaching as a unit, but fighting 
for individual honor, raiders unleashed their fury on wagon trains, farmsteads, 
ranches, warehouses, and sometimes even entire towns if the conditions were 
favorable for success.32  
After we discuss the targets of the Indian raiders, we will dive more deeply 
into the conduct of Indian raids and their outcomes.  This next section draws on a 
limited number of sources with the intent of presenting the full range of methods 
rather than an overview of Indian warfare on the Plains per se. 
2. The Enemies of Indian Raiders 
a. United States Government and Civilians 
United States citizens and armies were significant targets of Indian 
raiding from the 1860s through 1900.  Reasons were threefold.  First, the United 
States Government instituted a policy of ruthless brutality against the tribes of the 
Great Plains.  This constituted an ideological attack on the very existence of the 
Indians as people.  The orders of the cavalry under General Carleton in 1863 
read as follows, “The men are to be slain whenever and wherever they can be 
found.  The women and children may be taken prisoners, but, of course, they are 
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not to be killed.”33  Second, the government’s total war philosophy executed by 
Civil War veteran commanders invited Indian revenge, especially after hundreds 
of Cheyenne women and children were slain, scalped, and mutilated by cavalry 
troops at Sand Creek, Colorado in 1864.34  Or, for example, there was the 
specific targeting of Custer by the Kiowas, Arapahoes, Comanches, Apaches, 
and Cheyenne, because of the Washita River massacre in which Custer’s 7th 
Cavalry killed over 150 men, women, and children in an encampment that 
belonged to Chief Black Kettle, who was talking peace at Fort Cobb.35 Third, the 
government betrayed Indian leaders through its inability to follow through with 
treaties. Substandard living conditions, lack of food, and denial of hunting 
grounds while Indians were confined to reservations set many on the warpath 
even after they had been “pacified.”  The United States government’s continual 
disruption of the Indian’s lifestyle through relocation, manipulation of resources, 
and degradation caused warrior leaders, such as Cochise, to depart the 
reservation to lead life in the “wild,” raiding, looting, and killing as they saw fit to 
provide for their people.36 
American citizens became targets for Indian raids as they made 
themselves available to Indians in the area.  Unsuspecting civilians were 
especially vulnerable after 1850 when the western gold rush brought thousands 
of pioneers through the plains on their way to California.  Additionally, as 
Americans moved into Texas to settle, Indians noted the increasing stock-wealth 
of the territory and launched raids to steal that wealth from the widely dispersed 
and lightly defended Texans.  The more settlers that moved into Indian Territory 
made for easier and more frequent raiding targets for Indians looking for 
increased wealth, or for revenge for deaths of Indian warriors in previous raids.37  
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b. Mexican Landscape, Government and Civilians 
Meanwhile, raids were not just launched against Americans.  The 
Mexican government was plagued with so many changes in power and such 
poor security strategies during the 1800s that Indian raiders found themselves 
able to take advantage of northern Mexico as a fertile raiding ground.  Depending 
on who held power, the central government focused on defending against 
“organized” external threats from the United States, France, or Texas (where 
Santa Anna lost personal honor because of his defeat there in 1836).38 Under 
Santa Anna, Mexico became obsessed with regaining control over the wayward 
state of Texas, to the detriment of the other northern Mexican states, such as 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Sonora, which became easy targets for Indian 
raiders.39  Other leaders like Anastacio Bustamante refused to consider Indians 
an external security threat, and therefore left the northern Mexicans to deal with 
the raiders on their own with limited financial and military support from the central 
government.40 
Defunct security arrangements in northern Mexico allowed Indian 
raiders to exploit the citizens in this area for most of the century.  Mexican 
ranches and families in Northern Mexico were vulnerable to attacks given the 
vast amount of land needed to support large herds of horses, cattle, and sheep 
on the dusty desert.  Widely dispersed and therefore isolated family ranches 
were difficult to defend against stealthy, highly skilled, and ferocious raiders.41 
Knowledge and use of the Mexican desert terrain gave raiders an 
advantage over their sedentary victims.  Prior to the 1800s, the Lipan band of the 
Apache Indians mingled freely for generations with the population in the northern 
Mexican states.  The Lipan bands traded, herded, and worked among the settlers 
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in Mexican territory for years.  Comanche raiding parties sought after and used 
Lipan Apaches as guides and scouts to great advantage.  Lipan Apaches 
assisted Comanche raiders by providing much needed intelligence on the terrain, 
especially regarding routes and watering holes, as well as targets in the form of 
settlements, ranches, and warehouses, where plentiful plunder awaited.42  One 
key piece of terrain was the Bolson de Mapimi, a large lagoon-type area broken 
by scattered mountains and canyons with seasonal rivers flowing through it in 
north central Mexico.  Apache warriors knew this area well, but it was the 
Comanches who used it most extensively as a semi-permanent staging base 
from which to launch raids further south, deeper into Mexico.  Mexican authorities 
could not pursue raiders into this difficult terrain due to their insufficient 
knowledge of the area, and their over-burdened methods of travel.  This 
ungoverned sanctuary enabled the bold raiders from hundreds of miles north to 
re-group, organize and relax in between raiding attacks on nearby settlements.43  
Mexican countermeasures to Indian raids were an astounding 
failure.  Early attempts to pacify the Indians came through government support 
programs, whereby Indians received a ration of blankets, corn, salt, cigarettes, 
and beef throughout the year to support their families as the warriors hunted 
animals to complete their subsistence.  This method proved to be costly and, in 
effect, demoralized settlers who saw their entire tax revenue paid out to 
freeloading nomads.  In 1831, the state governments of Sonora and Chihuahua 
were determined to force the Indians to earn their own livelihood and ceased 
distribution of the subsidies.  That same year, the number and extent of raids 
increased significantly, initiating a chaotic period of raiding and stealing between 
Mexicans and Indians in the northern territories.44 
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Mexicans developed a marginally more effective counter-raiding 
strategy after citizens pleaded with their local leaders for help.  The governors of 
the northern states requested help from the central government in the form of 
standing armies and outposts, but those efforts proved futile in Mexico where tax 
revenues could not support such costly methods.  Governors then decided to 
take the fight to “los barbaros,” themselves.  The Governors of Chihuahua and 
Sonora armed their citizens, rallied their communities to band together against 
the nomads though a media-based, newspaper propaganda campaign, and 
continued to spend money to encourage citizens to support their local 
economies.  The economic dimension of this approach was designed to prevent 
a massive relocation of the Mexican population that would further isolate those 
who remained in the districts and would relegate them to becoming even easier 
targets for future Indian raids. 45 
After four years of increasing brutality and violence in the northern 
states resulted in negative population growth and a continuing decline in 
economic productivity, the Governors invited in scalp hunters.  Contrary to the 
Mexican government’s policy that everyone who lived in Mexico was by definition 
a Mexican national, northern governors, who were most affected by violent Indian 
raids from 1831–1835, enlisted the help of professional scalp hunters to eliminate 
their Indian problem. “A Chihuahuan plan promised one hundred pesos for the 
scalp of an Apache man, fifty for the scalp of a woman, and twenty-five for 
captured Apache children eleven years old and younger (apparently twelve-year-
olds were fit for scalping).”46  Scalp hunting was unpopular and not funded 
directly by the national government, but continued through the 1840s.  
Only when raiders affected the rich southern states of Durango, 
Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosi did Mexico consider Indian raiders a national 
security problem.  Then Mexico City dispatched army units and housed them in 
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garrisons called presidios spread out along the borders of Mexico to attempt to 
intercept the long-range raiders as they entered and exited the deeper provinces 
on month-long raiding expeditions.47  Mexican generals found their foe nearly 
impossible to catch.  By covering 100 to 125 miles per day, raiders outpaced the 
Mexican horse-borne army units two to one.  Weak horses, mules, and 
encumbering supply lines also hamstrung the Mexican units.  Eventually if 
Mexican units did catch up with or block raiders on their way out of Mexico, the 
damage in looting, killing, and the running off of livestock had already occurred, 
so the military effort in general was usually too little and too late to be effective.48 
By the late 1840s, Mexicans realized “The purely defensive war . . . 
is one that we have lost.”49  The next strategy attempted by Mexico to defeat the 
raiders was to go on the offensive to “Pursue them [Indians] as they pursue us.  
Threaten them as they threaten us.  Rob them as they rob us.  Capture them as 
they capture us.  Frighten them as they frighten us.  Alarm them as they alarm 
us.” 50  However, raising appropriately skilled, outfitted, and dedicated troops to 
conduct this kind of campaign proved impossible for the poor frontier territories, 
and offensive attacks that were successful in killing Indians only served to invite 
further vengeance from the surviviors. Consequently, under-funded forays into 
Apacheria and Comancheria, which resulted in the killing and butchering of 
Indian women and children, as well as the destruction of the vengeful warriors’ 
villages, did not yield significant gains.  
What Mexican states needed to do was to join forces.  However, 
they could not solidify thier common interests given the national view that the 
Indians were actually Mexicans by birthright, and did not pose an external threat 
to national security.  In contrast, Americans and Texans proved able to overcome 
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minor differences in other matters to join together and fight Indians in good faith.  
Indians in America were denied status as citizens.  Racist Indian hating stoked 
by numerous tales of outrageous violence, massacres, and treachery helped 
Americans and Texans do what Mexicans could not.  Attempts to assemble 
Mexican ranchers and farmers against raiding “barbarians, savages, and caribes” 
did not significantly galvanize Mexicans.51 
B. ULTRA VIOLENT RAIDING 
1. The Purposes of Indian Raids 
There were two main purposes for raids conducted by Indians.  Seeking 
plunder for economic gain was both a group and individual aim.  Seeking 
vengeance in the form of death and damage to an adversary who had killed 
Indians in previous engagements was the main social justification for launching 
raiding parties, as well as a powerful political concept used by bands to mobilize 
others to join them on the warpath.52 
a. Economic Gains 
In theory, raiding for plunder, animals, and human captives was a 
purely economic endeavor for small parties of skilled warriors. This type of raid 
was not well documented during this period of history.  Consequently, it is quite 
possible that many or most Indian raids in Mexico prior to 1830 were less violent 
than later raids.53  Typically, five or ten braves would cross the Rio Grande, drive 
off some livestock, loot a barn or hacienda, and then scoot back across the river  
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to relative safety.  Horses and captives were considered wealth among the 
Indians.54  As an Indian’s wealth increased, so did his ability to bestow gifts upon 
other Indians and, accordingly, his social status in the band increased as well.55   
b. Honor and Vengeance 
As noted earlier, the maintenance of honor and justice within social 
circles required Indian bands and chiefs to provide a moral justification for 
launching violent raids against a group of people.  In most cases, revenge or war 
parties could be justified to avenge particular warriors’ deaths or to claim a 
specific enemy’s scalp for the limited purpose of avenging a prior loss.  However, 
once the limited goals of revenge against that particular enemy were satisfied, 
the war party terminated its actions. Additionally it was always in good taste to 
join a neighboring Indian band on the warpath, not for  economic gain, but for the 
communal purpose of seeking justice for others’ losses.  The associated 
economic gains of raiding for vengeance were a convenient direct benefit for the 
individual warriors and indirectly supported the band that sent its warriors to 
fight.56 
The 1830s and 1840s saw both these reasons for raiding merge 
into a revolving door of violence against Mexicans.  Combining vengeance with 
the possibility of gaining large amounts of stock-wealth in the form of horses, 
cattle, and sheep, as well as pillaging the highly sought after textile goods that 
Mexican farms provided, Indians found just cause to form the relatively larger 
bands of warriors required to travel with confidence through the northern Mexican 
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but unstoppable in Mexico from 1830–1848. Comanche, Navaho, Kiowa, and 
Apache raiders killed over 2,500 civilians and captured over 800 in northern 
Mexico during this period.57  
By making peace with adjacent tribes and governments in Texas, 
New Mexico, and other American territories, Comanche Indians were able to 
direct their raiding parties solely against the Mexicans who rarely ventured north 
of the Rio Grande, and did not think to threaten the warriors’ home villages in 
order to defeat the raiding strategy employed by the Indians.  Some Mexican 
entrepreneurs actually rode along on Indian raids as guides.  These outlaws 
guided the Indians in order to deflect them away from their own settlements, 
share in the spoils, or simply because the Indians coerced them by using force to 
include torture.58  Without this kind of support, the Indian raids in Mexico would 
not have been so efficient.  
2. The Purposes of Government Counter-Raids 
There were two primary purposes for counter-raids conducted by 
governments in Mexico and the United States against Indians: to punish the 
Indians for not behaving as authorities had prescribed, and/or to kill them in order 
to break their will and claim their land.59  Punishing the Indians for attacking 
settlers or Plains forts was not only unsuccessful but, worse, often caused the 
Indians to attack again in order to seek revenge for losses suffered from the 
government’s punitive actions.  Killing Indians in sufficient numbers and with 
increasing brutality after the Civil War did eventually break the will of most 
nomadic tribes, and caused them to move to reservations and live under United 
States protection and rules. 60 
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As Indians adjusted to life on reservations, various shortcomings on 
reservations caused some small bands to leave the reservations and continue 
living the nomadic warrior lifestyle.  Unfair rules, restrictions and ineffective 
protection of the Indian reservations against encroachment by outside forces 
caused many Indians to resent these living arrangements.  Especially successful 
raiders who either resisted going to (or left) reservations in the late 1800s and 
conducted violent and effective raiding campaigns through Kansas, Texas, 
Arizona, New Mexico and Old Mexico include the famous Sioux leaders Sitting 
Bull and Crazy Horse, and Apache leaders Cochise, Victorio, Mangus Colorado 
and Geronimo.61  These Indians, labeled as irreconcilables, rose to greatness in 
part due to the counter-raiding and extermination tactics of the 1860s, conducted 
by the United States Army led by General William Tecumseh Sherman. 
a. Ruthless Cavalry Tactics Force Surrender of Cheyenne 
While pursuing the Sioux tribes in the Dakotas and Montana in the 
late 1860s and 1870s, the United States cavalry pursued total war against the 
Indians in an effort to break their will to fight.  In November 1864, Colonel J.M. 
Chivington, previously a Methodist preacher, took his 2nd Colorado Cavalry into 
Sioux country and tracked one band of Cheyenne led by Chief Black Kettle.  
Black Kettle was at peace with the whites.  He even raised an American flag over 
his teepee with a white flag above it to signal to the unit his peaceful intentions.  
Nonetheless, the cavalry sneaked into the area during the night, reached the 
unsuspecting village in the early morning, and attacked as day broke, killing 
women and children indiscriminately until the entire village was destroyed. “The 
troops were disorganized.  Some lined up and shot at the Indians.  The rest 
scattered widely.  Some looted the lodges; others killed stragglers; still others 
with ferocity never surpassed by the Indians themselves, scalped and mutilated 
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the dead.”62  Chivington even killed the Indian guide who led the cavalry to the 
village.  This example is representative of the tactics used by the cavalry when 
they stumbled upon the scattered settlements of Plains Indians. 
After similar engagements by the cavalry against the other 
Cheyenne Indian villages, many of the Cheyenne were forced to evacuate the 
sanctuary of the Powder River Valley without sufficient supplies in the dead of 
winter in 1876.  In the freezing cold, the Cheyenne fled over cliffs in the Black 
Hills to escape the cavalry’s hot pursuit.  However, the terrible December cold 
was more than the unprepared Indians could stand, and many soon surrendered 
after a week of constant harassment by the raiding cavalry.63  
This successful United States counter-raiding strategy unfolded in a 
progression of raiding and relentless pursuit.  First, the army penetrated and took 
over Indian lands that provided sanctuary.  Next, highly mobile cavalry units 
chased the Indians out of potential new sanctuary locations and kept the Indians 
on the run so that they could not attain the basic human needs of food, clothing, 
and shelter.  Through constant skirmishing, the Indian warriors and their families 
were successfully attritted and forced to surrender.  
C. RAIDING AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL TOOL 
Throughout the period of the Plains Indian Wars, raids were clearly used 
as a psychological tool.  Governments and Indians alike used violence to rally 
their own people against the opposing side, but also utilized raids to defeat the 
will of the enemy to fight.  The following incidents typify raiding and violence on 
the Plains and in the desert southwest between Indians, Mexicans, and 
Americans. 
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1. Indian Raids and the Impact on Citizens 
The Mimbren o Apaches, led by Mangus Colorado settled in present day 
New Mexico in the 1700s after a long migration across the North American 
plains.  In the 1850s, this band was pushed around its native area by incoming 
whites chasing fortunes in mining.  Mangus Colorado tried to work around the 
invaders peaceably, but after a horrible massacre staged by white trapper James 
Johnson in conjunction with Mexican miners, which killed over 400 men, women, 
and children near the Santa Rita mining community, Mangus Colorado went on 
the warpath.  He and a small band of his Mimbren o warriors conducted a war of 
vengeance against the Santa Rita people resulting in the literal destruction of the 
city through carefully reconnoitered and executed raids.  Authorities say that only 
six to ten non-Indians ever eventually escaped from Santa Rita.64  
2. Indians Ambush and Kill Cavalry “to a man” 
Chief Victorio of the Mimbreno Apaches waged raids designed to 
psychologically defeat his enemy.  In what Paul Wellman terms “the Double 
Massacre,” Victorio twice ambushed and annihilated Mexican forces at the same 
location leaving only the dead bodies to tell the tale of what occurred.  In 1879, 
Victorio escaped from the Fort Stanton, New Mexico reservation after learning 
that the government desired to relocate the tribe to San Carlos, Arizona.  Victorio 
raided his way through New Mexico and terrorized northern Mexicans, living off 
the plunder with a band of about one hundred warriors.  As the Mexican cavalry 
pursued him for weeks, Victorio laid a trap for an over-aggressive group of about 
fifteen scouts travelling near the Candelaria peaks.  Victorio’s sharpshooters 
initiated fire from one side of the valley, while warriors waited opposite them in 
the very terrain the adversary would use to take cover from the initial rifle fire.  
Once the cavalry moved into the covered area, the second group of warriors 
swooped down upon the unsuspecting Mexicans and slaughtered them all.  After 
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the first scouting party failed to return, the military commander sent another party 
to investigate.  Utilizing the dead bodies of the first troop as bait, Victorio laid in 
wait for the trailing party to congregate around the dead Mexicans in the valley 
before he again unleashed the Apache warriors.  The second attack was a near 
replica of the first, although it was likely shorter in duration due to the distraction 
of the cavalry by their slain comrades.65  In two engagements, Victorio thus 
announced and re-enforced his psychological message to Mexican and 
American authorities to not pursue or take lightly the power of his band, lest they 
experience the full brunt of his capable and determined Apache warriors. 
Chief Joseph, too, conducted a textbook raid against a cavalry troop of 
thirty-six men in the Salmon River Valley in present day Oregon and Idaho, after 
he was forced into war in the wake of a series of atrocities committed by a small 
band of his warriors in revenge for an Indian killed unjustly by a white man.  
Knowing the cavalry’s routes into and out of the local valleys, Joseph positioned 
his warriors along the high ground on both sides of White Bird Canyon.  As the 
troop entered the canyon, Chief Joseph launched a series of attacks both from a 
standoff position with his riflemen as well as by a furious horseback charge to 
destroy the troop “to a man.”66 Joseph’s first engagement with the Americans 
sent a remarkable message to the remaining cavalry in the area that the Nez 
Percé would spare no mercy on those who pursued them.  
3. Indians Take Women and Children as Plunder 
Indian raids in Mexico “consigned hundreds of Spanish women and 
children to bondage in native camps.”67  In September 1843, a Comanche 
raiding party attacked a ranch in the northern Mexican territory of Durango.  The 
Comanches wounded a man tending livestock and took his wife as a prisoner.  
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Although the woman finally evaded her captors, she was emotionally distraught 
and “very broken down.” 68   Another example comes from the diary of Mary 
Maverick, who nursed Matilda Lockhart who spent two years in captivity with the 
Comanche.  Maverick described Matilda: “Her head, arms, and face were full of 
bruises, and sores, and her nose was actually burnt off to the bone.  The nostrils 
were wide open and denuded of flesh.” 69  Even though the Indians held many 
more prisoners at their camps, Matilda was the single captive traded back to the 
whites in San Antonio to gain leverage during negotiations.  
In October of 1860, near the Sonoita River, an Irish settler named Johnny 
Ward left his Mexican wife and child behind at home as he tended to business on 
his farm.  That afternoon, a raiding band of Apaches under the command of 
Cochise “rode up to the house, plundered it, and drove off a herd of cattle.  They 
also carried away the child.”70  There is account after account like this—with the 
Comanches being particularly notorious. 
4. Terrorizing the Population En Route to a Safe Haven  
After Victorio escaped from the reservation, he conducted relentless 
raiding as his band moved from New Mexico down into the northern Mexican 
territories to seek refuge from pursuing American forces.  Once he had 
sufficiently outfitted his warriors and their families with the necessities of life—
horses, clothing, and food supplies Victorio made peace with local Mexican 
sheepherders and cattle ranchers who he allowed to live in constant service to 
his band.  The owners of ranches within Victorio’s control lived in constant fear of 
violent raiding or retribution and therefore “came forth with anything they [the 
Indians] demanded and were glad to get off with their lives.”71  Victorio’s previous 
raiding successes and his ability to resume raiding at any time gained him and 
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his band great power in the isolated regions of northern Mexico where neither the 
United States, nor Mexican authorities, possessed the skills or motivation to 
pursue him. 
Famished and dying in the allocated Indian Territory in present day 
Oklahoma, Little Wolf of the Cheyenne tribe led his dilapidated band off the 
reservation in Indian Territory in September 1878 to march north into Canada 
where they might lead a better life of hunting and farming.  To gain the necessary 
weapons and horses for the journey, he conducted raids over a thirty-mile front in 
Kansas with only a handful of capable warriors, while supporting the remainder of 
his nearly one hundred women, children, and old men.  The Cheyenne remained 
strictly focused on their journey north and let no one block their movement.  
Finding horses along the way, Little Wolf ruthlessly took them, and if the white 
owners resisted, the Indians killed them.72 
D. ATROCITIES FUEL VENGEANCE 
One historical point that stands out above all others is that real or 
imagined atrocities fueled rage, the desire for revenge, and destruction in mass 
quantities on all sides and by all parties.  There are debates in almost every case 
about which side actually initiated the atrocities, but that is not important to this 
study.  What is remarkable instead are the acts of depredation that occurred and 
the reactions they caused in the opposing forces. 
1. Mutilation of the Slain 
At the battle of Little Big Horn, Custer’s 7th Cavalry was destroyed to the 
last man in partial retaliation for the Massacre at Sand Creek, as described 
previously.  The first men on the scene, sent by Major Marcus Reno, found the 
slain Custer stripped, but not mutilated.  However, the majority of the 7th was 
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“butchered in some manner.”73  At the battle known as Fetterman’s Massacre led 
by Chief Red Cloud, along with Crazy Horse, the forty-seven man cavalry troop 
led by Fetterman was found dead “stripped, scalped, shot full of arrows and 
mutilated.”74 
During a raiding party into Northern Mexico, Geronimo’s mother, wife and 
three children were massacred and mutilated by the Mexican military.75 This 
single event fueled the famous chief to hate all those who were not Indians.  His 
rage, fueled by the desecration of his family, caused the Apache chief to 
slaughter upwards of ten ranchers a day while eluding the five thousand soldiers 
sent to try to catch him.  Particularly driven to punish those who offended him, 
Geronimo took time in the Santa Cruz Valley after killing the workers of a small 
ranch to torture the rancher’s wife in front of him until the man went insane.76 
Even Indian raids against other Indians reveal the very worst brutality that 
men could wreak each other.  In the summer of 1833, which is known in 
Comanche histories as “the summer that they cut off their heads,” Osage Indians 
from the eastern plains raided a Kiowa village of mostly women and children.  
The Kiowa men were away from the area at the time, likely on a raid in Mexico.  
The ruthless Osage raiders set the destroyed camp on fire and hacked off the 
heads of those they killed, stuffing them into brass buckets for the men to 
discover upon their return. 77 
2. Treatment of Captives 
Indian raiding created a psychological advantage, called the “shock of 
capture” in those who were unlucky enough to be taken prisoner in the course of 
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a raid.  In one instance, after stripping a Mexican captive of his clothes, a band of 
Comanches tried to calm and befriend him with kind words and by showing 
interest in his land, neighbors, and family.  Once the man calmed down and gave 
the Indians the intelligence they required to continue their quest for more horses 
and houses to raid in the surrounding area, the terrified man actually fell asleep 
at the feet of his captors.  The Indians shot the man to death and used the 
information he had given them to next raid upon his house, killing his wife and 
children in the following days.78 
The taking of captives was also economically useful, especially for the 
Comanche raiders in Mexico who utilized captives to extort ransoms, perform 
labor, or to sell to other Indians, Mexicans, or Texans.  Captured males were 
forced to look after the herd animals, break young horses and mules, and to 
make or repair saddles.  Literate captives were used to read and send 
messages.  Female captives labored in the Indian camps gathering wood, 
hauling water, cooking, watching children, making and repairing clothing, 
collecting food, and disassembling, packing, moving, and reassembling camp.  
Captive women also processed buffalo, and some captive women became 
mothers and wives in the tribe.79 
Cochise, in his struggle to remain free from reservation life, eluded the 
cavalry near Apache Pass in present-day Arizona.  While exchanging gunfire 
with the cavalry in the mountains, some of his warriors were taken captive.  Not 
to be without bargaining tools, Cochise took captive six members of a wagon 
train passing through his area.  Stories conflict, but it appears Cochise attempted 
to use the prisoners to negotiate the release of his men.  However, the cavalry 
refused the exchange so Cochise killed the six innocents on the spot.  In  
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retaliation, the cavalry commander killed six of the Indian warriors held prisoner.  
This incident fueled Cochise and the Apaches to continue their war against the 
white man for another twenty-five years.80 
A final example of the treatment of captives is a description of the great 
Mangus Colorado’s disdain for his enemies and desire to inflict pain and destroy 
the will of his enemy through ghastly deeds.  Having captured a group of 
Mexicans, the men were “seized, bound to the wheel of a wagon, head 
downward, about eighteen inches from the ground, a fire made under them and 
their brains roasted from their heads. . . The bursted heads, the agonized 
contortions of the facial muscles among the dead, and the terrible destiny certain 
to attain the living . . . were horribly depicted in my mind.”81 
E. RAIDING CAMPAIGN TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEEDURES 
In the Indian wars, both the Indians and government forces utilized raiding 
techniques to gain an advantage over their adversary.  For the Indians, raiding 
began as a style of life, more a matter of economics that was only tied into 
vengeance and honor as time passed and warriors were killed either by 
Mexicans defending their homes, or by cavalry soldiers seeking to punish tribes 
or to remove them from the Plains. 
As noted earlier, Victorio made exemplary use of ambush tactics against 
forces that sometimes outnumbered his own.  In case after case, cavalry leaders 
were duped into chasing a small band of Indian braves, only to be annihilated 
after crossing over a ridge or around a bend where the Indian traps were set with 
skill and efficiency deserving of admiration from any military tactician.  
Technological advances in communications played an important role in 
the later stages of the Indian wars.  Indians shrewdly cut the lines and downed 
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the poles that linked the frontier forts via telegraph to increase the amount of time 
before cavalry reinforcements could arrive at the scene.  At Fort Apache in 
August 1881, the Indians cut the telegraph lines and then raided the fort in an 
Indian uprising led by a medicine man named Nok-e-da-klinne who convinced his 
followers that he could bring dead Apaches back to life in order to restore their 
previous power on the frontier.82 
General George Crook, who fought the Indians extensively, chose in 1872 
to pursue a punishing campaign against the Apaches in Arizona’s mountainous 
Tonto Basin area.  A key consideration for Crook was to begin the raiding 
campaign on November 15th.  This date was set because it was the beginning of 
the winter season, which made it more difficult for the Indians to climb high into 
the mountains to evade the cavalry.  In addition, the cold temperatures forced the 
Indians to make campfires for cooking and warmth, with the smoke giving away 
the position of Indian camps to Crook’s scouting forces.83 
A significant government innovation during the Indian Wars was the cross-
border agreement between the United States and Mexican governments.  The 
Comanche, Kiowa, and especially the Apache under Geronimo enjoyed freedom 
of movement across the border, allowing the Indians to evade capture and direct 
confrontation by the United States and Mexican forces.  In 1882, the United 
States and Mexico finally agreed to allow hot pursuit of the raiders across the 
international border by cavalry units.  By June of that year, the entire Apache 
tribe to include those led by Geronimo, Nachite, and Loco surrendered to United 
States forces inside the borders of Mexico. 84 
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IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDING 
A. PURPOSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDING 
Unlike raids in a purely military context, law enforcement agencies 
conduct raids to capture fugitives or suspects.  There is no desire to damage or 
destroy property at the scene of the raid.  It is instead more desirable to 
apprehend the suspect without the loss or damage of evidence, which proves 
critical to the suspect’s prosecution in the criminal justice system.  Law 
enforcement agencies exist to protect citizens.  Raiding in this context is 
overshadowed by the need for safety and the importance of due process during 
the development of the case, execution of the raid, and in conducting the 
prosecution of the suspect. 
Raiding as a tactic is actually a last resort when it comes to fugitive 
apprehension by law enforcement in the United States.  Raiding has a propensity 
to cause an excited reaction in those whom the raid targets, and therefore poses 
significant risk to both the officers conducting the raid as well as innocent 
members of the fugitive’s family, neighbors, or passersby.85  For this reason, 
raids are conducted only when safer, less intrusive, more peaceful methods are 
ruled out due to issues of timeliness, the situation, or circumstances. 86 When 
raiding is necessary, law enforcement officers use successful techniques and 
procedures that have been shown to produce results. 
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B. PRINCIPLES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDING 
Law enforcement raiding follows a development and planning path similar 
to military raids so that it seems safe to say they share similar principles that 
result in success even though the context in which raids are conducted is 
different.  The principles of raiding for law enforcement units are intelligence, 
surprise, security, patience, speed, and safety. 
1. Intelligence 
The planning of a law enforcement raid begins with intelligence.  
Extensive legal requirements placed on law enforcement units in the United 
States with respect to the Fourth Amendment require that entry into houses or 
businesses be based on solid and verified information.  Raiding a private 
dwelling is a risky undertaking that possibly requires the use of force and poses a 
high potential for disaster with respect to civil rights, as well as with regard to the 
investigation.  “The investigative success and the tactical success are mutually 
interdependent.”87 
Law enforcement officers simultaneously build the case against the 
suspect for prosecution as well as develop the required pre-raid intelligence that 
allows for a successful apprehension of the fugitive.  Intelligence is categorized 
into three areas: “that pertaining to the suspect, that pertaining to the target 
location, and that pertaining to external influences.”88  This three-part intelligence 
estimate is simpler than the acronym-strewn method for Intelligence Preparation 
of the Battlefield (IPB) in the military system and serves to focus the investigating 
officer’s efforts.  Investigators, who eventually also conduct the capturing 
operation, accumulate as much information as possible about the suspect, his 
patterns of life, likely target locations, as well as those outside influences that 
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may affect the suspect and his actions at the targeted locations.  The critical 
factor driving the timing of the operation is executing the raid so that evidence is 
recovered and the suspect is prosecuted.89  Significant intelligence gathering 
must be conducted to ensure the target is arrestable, that sufficient evidence 
exists to prosecute the suspect, and that conducting the raid is the most effective 
method of apprehending the individual.90 
2. Surprise 
Surprise is a critical element of the law enforcement raid.  Law 
enforcement officers seek to avoid being surprised when they conduct raids, but 
they also desire to surprise the suspect, which helps provide an element of safety 
for the raiding force.  Limitations on the legal timing of search warrants may 
preclude officers from conducting raids during hours of limited visibility, when 
suspects are most likely home and sleeping, which is when military raiders prefer 
to strike.  In some areas, laws limit the execution of search warrants to between 
the hours of 7:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M. This is why many warrants are reported 
as having been executed right at 7:01 A.M., with suspects caught at their 
residence after sleeping there at night.91 
Law enforcement must gain the element of surprise through tactics.  Entry 
methods are one way that law enforcement officers gain surprise.  Using 
breaching tools or explosives, SWAT teams may gain entry to a suspect’s 
dwelling before he or she can react to the appearance of the officers.  Officers 
can also make entry by methods other than force.  Having uniformed police 
approach the residence as if there has been a normal call for assistance is one 
method of subterfuge that may get a suspect to open the door without realizing a  
 
 
                                            




raid is imminent.  Another indirect raiding method is to approach the location 
covertly and then enter the building when the door is opened as someone else 
enters or exits.92 
3. Security 
In law enforcement raiding, the main threat to the raiding force comes 
from the target building.93  In contrast to military raids behind enemy lines, there 
usually is no enemy ambushing force, reserve, or counter-attacking forces to 
deal with.  Security in the law enforcement context requires sufficient personnel 
and resources to adequately block fugitive escape from the targeted location, as 
well as prevent the suspect from preparing for the arrival of the raiding force.  
Most suspects will flee if given the opportunity during a raid, which causes 
additional security problems for the force and for the surrounding population. 
However, rules of engagement for use of deadly force by law officers do not 
allow an escape route to be “covered by fires” as such routes would be covered 
in a military raid.94  Rather, law enforcement raids utilize a technique of inner and 
outer perimeter security to prevent suspects from fleeing the scene.95 
Inner security personnel are dedicated to deal with the specific 
circumstances of the raided location, while outer security personnel both contain 
the objective and prevent outside elements from approaching.  Inner security 
personnel attempt to sort out individuals and assign evidence to people found on 
the target.  Assigning evidence such as guns or drugs to specific individuals on 
the premises greatly increases the chances of achieving a successful 
prosecution.  Outer security personnel must be prepared to quickly identify, 
pursue, and apprehend lookouts before they can alert suspects to the approach 
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of police officers.96  Additionally, outer security must prevent anyone from 
entering or leaving the area, so as to protect citizens as well as to block the 
escape of wanted persons. 
4. Patience 
Patience is a principle of the law enforcement raid because of the many 
outside factors that must be considered.  First, at the outset of the raid process 
the investigator must gather huge amounts of information through various 
means.  Getting tips from informants, checking the reliability of those informants, 
talking to beat cops who know the area, setting up and recording surveillance on 
suspects and locations, identifying associates, and researching their past 
behaviors can require weeks, months, or even years before a suspect can be 
actively pursued.  Pre-raid intelligence is critical to developing a probable cause 
package, which allows the investigator to secure a search warrant, and then 
inform his executing teams about the background of the case.97   To determine 
where a target is best apprehended the investigator must also consider the 
physical location of the raid.  Is it close to a school, daycare facility, or a busy 
street where pedestrian traffic is high?  All of these factors go into determining 
the best time, method, and location of apprehension.  From the very beginning to 
the possibly non-climactic end of the raid, officers must remain patient and 
vigilant to react to changing information and conditions. 
5. Speed 
Counter-intuitive as it may seem, acting with speed goes hand in hand 
with being patient.  Both speed and patience are required to protect innocent 
bystanders, officers involved in the raid, as well as to ensure that the most 
accurate, complete, and thus effective investigation is conducted.  Law 
enforcement utilizes speed at the tactical level to reduce the possibility of a 
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hostile standoff.98  Tactical speed is also critical in ensuring that the suspects are 
caught with the associated evidence of their crimes.  This is especially important 
when dealing with drug offenders who may destroy evidence very quickly once 
they have been alerted to an impending raid on their location.99  When to strike, 
meanwhile, requires strategic use of speed.  If a suspect is located, but is known 
to move from safe-house to safe-house, then the officers must react with haste 
and conduct a speedy raid upon the known location in order to have their best 
chance of apprehension. 
6. Safety 
Safety is perhaps the greatest consideration for law enforcement raids.  In 
a chapter dedicated to raid planning and execution, Sergeant Paul Mahoney 
describes the particular details of law enforcement raiding from start to finish.  
Every step, from investigation to prosecution, is conducted either directly or 
indirectly for safety’s sake.100 
During pre-raid intelligence collection, the investigator collects volumes of 
details on the suspect, location, and external factors so that he can first devise 
the safest and most effective time, method, and location by which to apprehend 
the fugitive. Investigators bear in mind the safety of the raiding force, of the 
fugitive and his associates, as well as that of the surrounding population.  
Intelligence collection serves to identify all hazards that may be associated with a 
suspect at the particular time and location where the raid will be executed, again 
to provide the greatest measure of safety for those who will conduct the 
operation.101 
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Prior to conducting the raid, numerous documents are prepared to help 
ensure the safety of the force and the population.102  Relevant intelligence 
products along with sketches, photos, diagrams, and videotapes are compiled 
into the probable cause package.  The probable cause package adds to safety in 
two ways:  First, in the context of due process and the Fourth Amendment, it 
protects the general public from the police raiding houses unnecessarily without 
proper oversight and authorizations.  Second, the probable cause package 
serves as the one-stop document for team members so that everyone is familiar 
with the case prior to execution of the raid.  In situations where multiple teams 
are brought together to conduct a raid for a specific investigation, this information 
is extremely important in providing the necessary background so that officers 
conducting the raid can make informed and justified decisions, especially when 
using deadly force. 
Safety is especially critical during execution of the operation.  Dino 
Bardoni, with 26 years of experience in police investigative work, suggests that a 
peaceful resolution to high-risk situations is always best.103  Given that the goal 
of the tactical raid is to seize suspects with incriminating evidence and to do so 
with the minimum risk to the force and the population, all details such as the 
approach, entry, team communications, uniforms, and contingencies are covered 
prior to the raid to minimize risk to officers and to protect the community. 104 
C. RAIDING AGAINST GANGS AND DRUG CARTELS 
1. Gangs are Similar to Terrorist Groups 
Street gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13), the 
Bloods, Crips, Nortenos, Sortenos and others are similar to terrorist  
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organizations.  What the definition of a gang is, is much debated in the literature 
about gangs, but two accepted definitions that bear resemblance to definitions of 
terror groups are Frederic Thrasher’s: 
The gang is an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, 
and then integrated through conflict.  It is characterized by the 
following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement 
through space as a unit, conflict, and planning.  The result of this 
collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective 
internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group 
awareness, and attachment to a local territory.105 
And Walter Miller’s definition: 
A youth gang is a self-formed association of peers, bound together 
by mutual interests, with identifiable leadership, well-developed 
lines of authority, and other organizational features, who act in 
concert to achieve a specific purpose or purposes which generally 
include the conduct of illegal activitiy and control of a particular 
territory, facility, or type of enterprise.106  
These two definitions echo many concepts cited by Marc Sageman in his 
book Understanding Terror Networks about members of the Global Salafi Jihad.  
Sageman posits that Global Salafi Jihad members share the following traits:  
First, they belong to the Jihad for the purpose of “social affiliation through 
friendship, kinship, and discipleship.”  Next, members undergo a “progressive 
intensification” of their beliefs which leads them to accept and devote their lives 
to the salafi jihadist ideology.  Lastly, members are formally accepted through a 
link (some other person) who is already in the jihad.  Sageman points out that 
social bonds are the critical element in joining the group together since these 




                                            
105 Kimberly Tobin. Gangs: An Individual and Group Perspective. (Pearson—Prentice Hall, 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: 2008). 18. 
106 Ibid., 20. 
 57
reinforces this fact by stating that the “in-group love” between members of the 
group is the sticky glue that holds the members together and intensely motivates 
their desire to belong.107 
Terrorists and gang members join their respective organizations for social 
reasons.  One theory of gang membership states that people join gangs because 
of their need for peer group identification, which correlates directly with 
Sageman’s identification of the jihad organizations’ important social function. 108  
Gangs also provide a set of internally respected values and confer status on 
those who most stringently dedicate themselves to the deviant values of the gang 
ideology.109  Members in good standing are willing to engage in the violent 
actions of turf defense, homicide, assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated 
battery and assault, arson, intimidation, robbery, forcible rape, kidnapping, 
vandalism, burglary, larceny, and drug trafficking.110 
Further evidence of the social networking aspect of gang membership and 
its close similarity to membership in terrorist organizations is revealed in the 
development of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS–13) in inner city Los Angeles in the 
1980s.  As Salvadoran immigrants settled into the low income neighborhoods of 
Los Angeles, they became victims of crime at the hands of mostly Mexican street 
gangs.  In an attempt to protect themselves and their Salvadorian identity, young 
men grouped together in maras or “posses” to protect their family and friends.  
Eventually these newly formed gangs adopted a wide range of illegal money-
making ventures and grew increasingly violent as a way to enforce in-group 
loyalty and their pecking order.  The more violent the gang member the higher 
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and faster in the gang leadership that individual rose.111  This ascension and 
assimilation of violent, dedicated, and socially tied together individuals mimics 
what is found in Global Salafi Jihad groups.  Ayman al Zawahiri, for instance, 
rose to the ranks of leadership in Al Qaeda through his dedication to the jihadi 
cause begun in the 1980s against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  Through his 
sanction of increasingly violent operations and radical interpretations of Islam he 
progressed to the top of an organization he helped create. 
2. Who Conducts Law Enforcement Raids in the U.S.? 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams formed in local, county, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies conduct most raids in the United 
States. After their conceptual development in the 1960s, SWAT teams and 
techniques ballooned in the 1980s, thanks to increased funding, the development 
of more specialized equipment, and greater legal authorization for paramilitary 
police techniques from the federal government.112  
Salinas, California, which is a central Californian city of approximately 
150,000 permanent residents and an additional 50,000 transient, migratory farm 
workers, employs a SWAT team consisting of 22 personnel.  The team is broken 
into two sections, each led by an experienced police sergeant with from 8 to 12 
years of law enforcement experience.  The Salinas SWAT team specially selects 
officers from within the police force.  First, every member of the SWAT team 
must be a volunteer and must receive recommendations from his superiors 
regarding his past performance.  Prospective members are then tested and must 
continually maintain increased physical fitness standards and must demonstrate 
above average proficiency with both their service pistol and assault rifles in 
situational exercises called stress shoots.  Finally, a selection board consisting of 
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the SWAT team commander and sergeants interviews each SWAT candidate.113  
Following selection and assignment to the SWAT unit, each officer must, by law, 
take basic and advanced skills development courses in a continuous learning 
system that balances executing the SWAT mission with training in order to 
maintain and increase proficiency.114  This means the Salinas SWAT team can 
be considered an elite unit of volunteers selected for their performance and 
potential to perform under difficult conditions, as well as in intense situations 
where skills and good judgment are critical to success.  This is very similar to the 
selection process and criteria of any Special Operations unit in the United States 
Military. 
3. The Investigation 
“Raiding someone’s private domain for the purpose of executing a search 
warrant is implicitly risky.”115  The investigative preparation required to do so, as 
previously indicated, is undoubtedly the most important part of what is often a 
long process.  The investigation sets the stage for successful conduct of the raid, 
and the successful conduct of the raid allows the investigation to continue with 
booking, prosecution, and sentencing.116 
Maximizing the likelihood of capturing the suspect with sufficient evidence 
to charge and convict him in the courts is an extremely important point that must 
not be overlooked when comparing law enforcement raids conducted against 
gang criminals to those conducted against terrorists who many say should be 
prosecuted in the national criminal justice system.117  
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As with the military’s Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, all sources 
of intelligence are collected.  Law enforcement agencies rely significantly on 
human intelligence (HUMINT) in the form of confidential informants, undercover 
officers, and data culled from databases of gang and gang member information 
collected from within and across jurisdictions.118  Police agencies have the 
capability to conduct some limited signals intelligence (SIGINT) when targeting 
gang members whose phone information is known, but these resources are 
limited and legal barriers to conduct wiretapping are significant.  Additionally, with 
the advent of popular television shows and movies disclosing law enforcement 
and military procedures, well-informed gang members change their phones or 
phone numbers to avoid technical detection or eavesdropping by the 
authorities.119  Video image intelligence (IMINT) is in high demand and cameras 
are often emplaced at fixed locations to capture video footage in high crime 
areas and places where gang activity is most frequently reported.  Video 
surveillance cameras from private or public sources are frequently utilized to 
garner photos of suspects who have transited through an area prior to or after 
committing crimes.120 
Prior to conducting a raid, law enforcement personnel must prove to a 
judge the veracity of the intelligence they have collected in order to receive the 
search warrant required.  This detailed, and sometimes legally exhausting, 
approach to developing intelligence should be more fully appreciated and 
considered for implementation by military forces tasked with capturing terrorists.  
If, or as, terrorism is re-criminalized and terrorists are accorded rights and due 
processes afforded to citizens, law enforcement processes are worth studying for 
a variety of reasons.  First, they will help increase the likelihood of capturing the 
suspected terrorist.  Secondly, this process minimizes the likelihood of collateral  
 
                                            




damage to innocents.  Lastly, following tried and tested law enforcement 
techniques for developing prosecutable intelligence will ensure that terrorists, 
when caught are then prosecuted to the full extent of the law. 
4. The Raids 
a. The Surround and Call-out 
Law enforcement raids fall into two categories: the instantaneous 
situation and the deliberately planned event.121  The instantaneous raid results 
from an event occurring in the community, such as a barricaded shooter, or when 
officers chase a suspect to a private residence where the suspect then gains the 
upper hand by holing up in a defensive posture.  The instantaneous situation will 
most likely be handled by what law enforcement teams call a “surround and call-
out.”122  In contrast, the deliberately planned raid event is just that, as has been 
described in previous sections. 
The surround and call-out is a raiding technique that could be used 
by military forces.  The basic premise of this technique is to surround the 
residence with both an inner and outer perimeter and then utilize a crisis 
negotiator to attempt to resolve the stand-off peacefully.123  In this manner, the 
law enforcement raiders are able to avoid the most dangerous portion of the raid, 
which is the actual breach and entry into the home.  Some variations on the 
“surround and call-out” theme consist of escalating force by using diversionary 
devices, actual lethal force, or chemicals such as smoke, tear gas, or pepper 
spray devices.  These chemical munitions irritate the occupants of the building 
and render them less capable of inflicting harm on the raiding force and make 
them more likely to negotiate a peaceful surrender.124 






The strengths of this method are safety for the officers and the 
suspects involved in the incident.  By avoiding a gunfight at nearly all costs 
officers, suspects, and bystanders are much safer than if the raiding force makes 
a dynamic entry.  This method is especially useful when law enforcement officers 
are required to knock and announce their presence prior to entry of a residence.  
The knock and announce requirement as stipulated in many search warrants 
alerts the criminal fugitive to the impending raid and forfeits the element of 
surprise.125  This makes the surround and call-out technique a lifesaver.  
Additionally, the use of chemical munitions such as smoke, tear gas, and pepper 
spray help preserve life at the scene of the raid by eliminating the need for a 
gunfight. 
The drawbacks to the surround and call-out technique are that it 
takes a significant force to surround an average residence and all its escape 
routes.  Additionally, the call-out technique requires time to be successful.  On a 
normal inner city street, the police can sit and wait out a fugitive for as long as 
necessary to negotiate a peaceful surrender.  However, for a military unit in an 
enemy sanctuary, time may not be available to execute this method.  Lastly, the 
escalation of force using chemical munitions to force the surrender of suspected 
terrorists in a military setting is frowned upon, if not banned outright.  This is due 
to poorly worded or interpreted rules of war related to the Geneva conventions, 
and a lack of clear and congruent U.S. policy on the use of tear gas with respect 
to these treaties.126  This is ironic, of course, given the likelihood that riot crowd 
control munitions actually save lives when used in the raid scenario. 
b. The Dynamic Entry 
The dynamic entry raid is similar to the military style raid in that 
escape routes from the suspect’s location are isolated and then a forced entry is 
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made upon the residence.  The reasons for conducting a forced entry are to gain 
“superiority of personnel and firepower, swiftness of execution, the element of 
surprise, and security of the inner and outer perimeters.”127  The method of entry 
depends on three factors:  first, where the target location is barricaded or fortified 
against entry; second, where the suspect has a violent history or is likely armed 
and willing to fight the raiding force; third, where the arrest of the suspect away 
from the location is not possible, and it is likely that the suspect will destroy 
incriminating evidence upon realization that a raid is imminent.128 
Entry teams may use battering rams, pry bars, hooligan tools, 
trucks with log chains, shotgun breaches, and even explosive charges to gain 
entry into suspect locations.129  These manual breaching techniques may be 
effective for experienced users and in situations where barricades or reinforced 
entries are not expected.  However, in cases where the location may be fortified, 
the use of explosive charges provides a breach as well as shock and surprise, 
and this may reduce organized resistance against the entering force.130 
Upon entry into the raided location, officers clear rooms and secure 
personnel on the premises as they encounter them.  Officers subdue any threats 
to the raiding force prior to conducting detailed searches of the building.  The 
investigating officers are responsible for planning and executing the “handling of 
prisoners, processing of paperwork and prisoner transportation.”131  Sergeant 
Mahoney of the Denver Police Department recommends having a female officer 
on hand to search female prisoners on target.132  This serves to prevent the 
appearance or the perception of any improprieties, while also ensuring that 
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female suspects are searched thoroughly.  In many cases, males are 
uncomfortable searching female suspects, and fail to find critical evidence.  After 
the building is secure, investigators can take their time in searching the premises, 
documenting the evidence found on site, and conducting preliminary questioning 
of personnel at or near the location.  Conducting a thorough investigation at the 
scene of the raid is especially important for the prosecution of captured suspects. 
These principles of entry and investigation are directly applicable to 
military raids.  Utilizing the most high tech dynamic entry methods allows the 
raiders to gain the element of surprise, which is vitally important to the success of 
raids.  Searching and investigation techniques learned from law enforcement 
may be used against terrorist suspects to ensure evidence is collected and 
prosecution possibilities are maximized.  Lastly, during raids in Middle Eastern 
countries, the treatment of women is highly scrutinized, and involving female 
soldiers to search women found at the target site may prevent negative reactions 
from local authorities. 
c. Subterfuge and other Entry Methods 
Alternatives to forced entry give the raiding force flexibility.  When 
commanders identify that the forced entry of a building is not possible, or the 
consequences would be unacceptable due to the likelihood of damage or inciting 
violence, officers should consider using subterfuge or other scams in order to 
gain access to the target building.  Some suspects may be caught off guard by 
entering behind someone with whom they are familiar.  Once the familiar person 
opens the door to the residence, the raiding force will hold the door open and 
enter behind the unwitting or witting third party.  Having a confidential informant 
to conduct this action provides a definite advantage to the raiding force, although 
the use of that informant in future cases would then be jeopardized.133  
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Another method for capturing a suspect when the chances for 
successful entry are not likely or too dangerous is simply to not enter.  The 
raiding force may choose to conduct surveillance on the target location and then 
capture the suspect as or after he or she leaves the building.  Where the 
surrounding population is subject to unacceptable danger, it may be better to 
watch the suspect and then conduct a mobile raid on his vehicle at a location that 
is more permissible.  This scenario works well if it is likely that the suspect will 
react violently to a raid on his house.  In this way the police still choose the 
location of the raid, are able to detain their suspect, and maintain the possibility 
to enter the targeted premises with the suspect in custody to gain additional 
physical evidence as required.134  These alternate methods may be a more 
effective, although not necessarily efficient, technique for detaining suspects 
while protecting the population and the police force.135 
These methods are also useful for military forces operating in 
foreign countries.  Using alternative methods of entry and capture may alleviate 
news headlines that condemn America’s willingness to kill innocents and damage 
civil structures.  Additionally, fugitives that are captured by less violent methods 
may be more likely to provide information, especially when their household was 
not destroyed by his captors.  
5. Prosecution and Follow-up Law Enforcement Against Gangs 
Capturing gang members in raids presents slightly different challenges 
than capturing other kinds of suspects. Traditional laws regarding drug trafficking, 
homicide, assault with a weapon, robbery, home invasion, arson, extortion, 
witness intimidation, and theft obviously apply to gang related suspects, but 
innovative law enforcement initiatives also complement these traditional “tools.”  
Two of these provisions are: “(1) laws directed at gangs and gang members and 
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(2) laws providing for enhanced punishment for crimes . . .”136  Apprehending 
someone on a racketeering charge is one prosecutorial method that carries with 
it stiff penalties.  Additionally, specific gang laws criminalize gang acts 
themselves as “separate, substantive” crimes that are separate and in addition to 
more traditional crimes.  Other enhancements include extended sentences for 
“possessing a firearm, committing a crime in a school or other protected zone, 
and furthering gang ties or motives.”137  It is also possible to outlaw membership 
in specific gangs.  Concurrent with laws targeting gang activities directly are 
enhanced punishments.  These can automatically add minimum sentence 
requirements for gang related crimes.138 
The earlier a prosecutor becomes involved with gang-related 
investigations, raids, and arrests, the more likely it is a successful prosecution 
will result.  Prosecutors who are brought into the planning process for deliberate 
raids can assist in preparing search warrants, advising and seeking legal 
authority for the use of electronic surveillance, and selecting the charges most 
likely to result in successful prosecution and long term incarceration.139 
Some big cities have specialized prosecution offices devoted to gang 
crimes or even to specific gangs.140  Vertical prosecution refers to situations 
where the prosecuting attorney is trained in, and devoted full-time to, gang 
matters, and is responsible for the case from start to finish.  Prosecutors 
dedicated to gang cases become attuned to the culture, personality, and “guns-
and-drugs economy of the street gang.”141  With sufficient knowledge, these 
attorneys are able to understand the street jargon gang members use during  
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questioning, which results in subjects revealing more information than they 
intended, especially since, to the gang member, the prosecutor surely appears 
ignorant of the true meaning behind gang sayings or symbols.142 
Following through with prosecution of gang members and publicizing the 
stiff penalties associated with gang-related crimes helps convince the public that 
the police can conduct meaningful raids.  As long as the raids inflict reasonable 
(meaning acceptable) levels of violence and do not alienate the public, plus so 
long as they result in successful prosecution of the targeted criminals, then law 
enforcement agencies are considered effective and retain the public’s trust and 
confidence.143  These prosecution techniques may be used effectively against 
terrorists if similar laws are adopted and terrorists are convicted of their wrong 
doings in court and then sentenced accordingly.  In this way, raiding against 
terrorist enemies may be made to seem worthwhile and less intrusive to the 
protected population. 
D. PROBLEMS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT RAIDS 
1. Problems with Raid Execution  
Forced entry style raids conducted in the U.S. can cause a media 
firestorm, such as the debacle at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco,Texas 
or the tragedy that occurred at Ruby Ridge, in Idaho.  Local raids often lead to 
considerable scrutiny by local newspapers. The libertarian think tank, The CATO 
Institute, makes a case for reducing what Radley Balko calls “paramilitary police 
raids.”144  Balko cites five major problems with raids, but limits most of his 
argument to raiding in the execution of drug warrants. 
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In general, critics of raiding condemn the tactic as the militarization of 
civilian policing.145  However, comparing the requirement for the military to “seek 
out, overpower, and destroy an enemy” to the police requirement of “keeping the 
peace” is an unfair comparison.146  Sharing techniques and networking between 
military and civilian law enforcement can only serve to improve both 
organizations.  Collaboration allows leaders from all agencies to learn and 
appreciate the differences and similarities between military and law enforcement 
operations while incorporating new ideas, frameworks, and guidelines thanks to 
increased cross-talk.147  As long as each organization stays true to its assigned 
purposes and ethics, collaboration should be of considerable national benefit.  
Yes, raiding may cause an escalation in violence.148  This critique is fair, 
and as pointed out in both the literature and in an interview with an experienced 
SWAT commander, investigating officers desire to apprehend suspects using the 
absolute minimum of force required.  This not only protects the officers who 
execute the apprehension, but also preserves the lives of suspects, their families, 
associates, and especially the innocent bystanders who happen to be near the 
raid location.  Indeed, the use of the surround and call-out technique avoids the 
requirement for officers to forcefully enter residences, which Balko cites as a 
major contributor to retaliatory violence by either armed suspects or innocent 
civilians protecting households.149 
Another criticism has to do with raids executed at the wrong place 
because police “relied on information from confidential informants.”150  Without 
question, disastrous consequences result from raiding the wrong location where 
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otherwise innocent civilians take up arms against forceful entry.  However, this 
does not occur when there is a thorough police investigation prior to the conduct 
of an operation.  Utilizing the general principles outlined above, and always being 
skeptical of and corroborating all tips and information received from informants 
prevents police or military forces from making such mistakes.  In other words, 
sufficient corroboration of intelligence through multiple sources and the patient 
pursuit of suspects at a time and place where the probability of capture is highest 
renders this a inaccurate criticism.151 
2. Problems with Raiding Policy 
Some criticize raiding, believing it to be only a defensive or reactionary 
measure.152  Yet, consider the State of Florida’s Gang Reduction Strategy.  It 
identifies the strength of gangs to be “their ability to attract a continual stream of 
young recruits to their ranks.”153  Florida’s strategy to combat this gang enemy 
focuses on three pillars.  The first pillar consists of prevention and intervention. 
The second concentrates on law enforcement objectives. The third pillar focuses 
on rehabilitation and re-entry.  Only two of the seven law enforcement objectives 
specify arresting gang members, while the remaining five concentrate on 
prosecution techniques and priorities.154 
 1.  Compile a statewide priority list and target every major criminal gang in 
Florida for dismantling by arresting and prosecuting gang leaders and key 
gang members. 
 2.  Identify and target for arrest and prosecution all gang kingpins in 
Florida and seek life imprisonment sentences. 
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 3.  Prioritize the prosecution of gun crimes related to gangs and gang 
members and target for prosecution those who provide guns to juvenile 
gang members ineligible to own or possess a gun. 
 4.  In areas of intense gang activity, build community policing, remove 
firearms from low to mid-level gang members and use injunctive powers to 
prohibit gang members from gathering. 
 5.  Improve intelligence gathering and information sharing on gangs an 
gang members and their activities among and between federal, state, and 
local law enforcement, prosecuting authorities, schools and Juvenile 
Justice, Corrections, and Children and Families officials. 
 6.  Strengthen gang law enforcement and prosecution with more uniform, 
specialized training and designate one Assistant State Attorney in each 
judicial circuit whose sole, full-time responsibility is to prosecute and 
manage the prosecution of gangs, gang members and gang-related 
crimes. 
 7.  Coordinate federal, state and local law enforcement / prosecution 
efforts toward the common objective of combating gang activitiy in Florida, 
including setting priorities and targeting certain gangs, gang activities and 
gang-related prosecutions all over Florida. 
Of the remaining eleven objectives under the other pillars, none reference 
arresting current gang members.155 
As is true for any effective counter-insurgency plan, the majority of efforts 
will center on protecting the population and preventing the gangs (insurgents) 
from recruiting and maintaining their membership.156  This makes raiding an 
instrumental part of the overall campaign plan, but it should not be the sole focus 
of every agency dedicated to helping solve the problem. 
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Finally, Balko cites a general lack of accountability or liability on the part of 
police agencies that make mistakes in conjunction with forced entry raids.157  But 
this, too, is a problem that is not overly difficult to fix.  By applying extreme 
diligence to the investigation, selection, and prosecution of raided targets, raiding 
forces can stay on the moral high ground and thereby maintain public support.  
The raiding force can display its high ethical standards and professional conduct 
by demonstrating to the public that extensive controls are in place to limit the 
damage and destruction inflicted during raids.  These measures may include 
tighter standards for search warrants (or tighter standards for target selection by 
military units), additional transparency measures such as videotaping raids, and 
possibly implementing review boards to determine why excessive force was used 
on botched or controversial raids.158  These measures would not only serve to 
protect the victims of botched raids, but they also publicize and reinforce the 
positive aspects of raiding as suspects are apprehended in a controlled, 
professional, and humane manner. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this project has been to examine the value of conducting 
special commando raids in order to achieve strategic gains against a networked 
enemy in the Global War on Terrorism.  It is intended to explore what kinds of 
raids are strategically useful, how different agencies conduct raids, and what 
techniques exist that result in strategic gains. 
1. On Raiding 
Raids conducted by specialized units can closely scrutinize the use of 
violence, reducing incidents of collateral damage and affording investigators and 
intelligence analysts the ability to more thoroughly investigate terrorists and their 
operating environment for further exploitation.  Commando raids also allow us to 
capture rather than just kill our adversaries. 
The psychological gains associated with raids may prove valuable in 
winning the information battle with terrorists in another sense.  By penetrating 
their world, we send a meaningful psychological message.  This has the potential 
to influence local and regional audiences as well as the American public, thereby 
ensuring that raids continue to be a boon to our strategy rather than attracting 
negative media scrutiny or raising public concerns about military methods, 
motives, or morals. 
Raids are a critical aspect of disrupting terrorist operations worldwide.  
Utilizing proven raiding principles will ensure tactical success by helping us deny 
terrorists safe sanctuary.  But shaping perceptions about raids must be 
considered as well, in order to ensure the long term success of our grand 
strategy. The United States should exploit successful raids in the information 
domain by maximizing the strategic gain won by each operation.  Successful 
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raids should then drive our ability to develop additional timely and accurate 
intelligence.  This intelligence, quickly rolled into target packages and executed 
by ethically competent and tactically capable forces will assist the United States 
in defeating terrorist organizations.  The continued ability and national will to 
conduct audacious, long-range raids will be especially important as the open 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan dissipate, and the world returns to more “peace-
like” political conditions. 
2. Lessons from the Indian Raids 
Looking at historical accounts of the Indian raids teaches us important 
lessons for raiding in the future.  It may be necessary to kill a large number of the 
enemy in order to defeat his will to fight.  Effective raiding requires that an 
extremely accurate and discriminating use of force be delegated to commandos 
who then accept the responsibility to make life or death choices on a person-by-
person basis at the very last second.  The discriminating use of force in raids 
compares favorably with the gratuitous and arbitrary violence perpetrated by 
terrorists.  But, it also compares favorably with what is inadvertently achieved by 
air strikes conducted against the same targets, where the likelihood of collateral 
damage is higher without eyes-on, ground level intelligence—which a raiding 
party is more likely to be able to gather in person on site.  In this comparison of 
what causes least harm to innocents, the United States’ image in any society that 
values life will be boosted to higher levels.  
It is important to treat civilians, as well as captured enemy personnel, with 
humanity.  Maintaining the moral high ground through proper treatment of 
detainees and prisoners is critically important to our image of ourselves, to our 
allies and, most importantly, to the population where and for whom we fight. 
As we look to historical cases to find ways to improve current techniques, 
the effect of atrocities on both sides in the Indian Wars should serve as a 
constant reminder of why it is so important to place ethical treatment of detainees 
at the top of our list of priorities.  This simple maxim could mean the difference 
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between someone joining the jihad or joining us.  Individual informants who know 
the details of secret plots could hold exactly the information that authorities 
require to prevent future terrorist attacks. 
Taking family members captive, as the Plains Indians did so frequently, 
may be a logical, humane way to force terrorists to surrender.  While the ill-
treatment of women and children held by Indian captors should not be our model, 
using family members to compel outlaws to the bargaining table may be useful to 
preserve life on a larger scale.  This technique may be in violation of the current 
laws of warfare but, like all laws, they should be periodically examined and 
possibly amended. 
Finally, the ruthless cavalry techniques used against the Indians may be 
justified, in some cases, when it is required to kill your enemy and defeat his way 
of life in order to preserve your own.  Ideally, this should never again seem to be 
necessary, but in dealing with people who believe their atrocities are justified by 
a higher power, such as salafi jihadists, this may be more applicable than most 
Americans realize. 
3. Lessons from Law Enforcement Raids 
Law enforcement raids provide an example of methods that should be 
considered for use in military applications against terrorists.  The principles 
common to military and police raiding suggest that there are certain techniques 
both can use.  For instance, lessons learned through countering gangs in 
America may be applied to counter-terrorism operations around the world in the 
form of raid tactics, as well as prosecution techniques and legal code 
refinements. 
Incorporating law enforcement investigation methods may prove beneficial 
to raid planners in military organizations.  So could using police style entry 
methods.  Most law enforcement methods serve to increase the safety of raids 
for both the raider and the defender, so certainly in any situation involving 
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civilians, these methods should be supported because they preserve life.  Of 
particular use may be riot control devices, such as tear gas, to increase the 
probability that standoffs between military forces and surrounded terrorist 
suspects may be negotiated to a peaceful end. 
Lastly, the historic and ongoing criticism of how raids are conducted on 
American soil should be taken into consideration, and methods developed to 
allay critics’ concerns should be adapted by the military when it finds itself in 
similar situations.  For instance, videotaping raids ensures raiders adhere to rules 
of conduct, and provides unequivocal transparency when locals make false 
accusations against the raiding force.  These should be seen as tools to increase 
the public’s willingness to accept raiding methods and results.  Additionally, 
ensuring that informant information is correct, and using the minimum force 
required, are principles of investigation that should guide military planners. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis represents a first attempt to collate raiding best practices for 
the War on Terrorism.  There is room to investigate a number of specific raids in 
both the military and law enforcement arenas to analyze what might be learned 
that can be used for raids against terrorists.  Some specific instances that 
warrant study are the failed raid at the Branch Davidian Compound in Waco, 
Texas, as well as investigation into any number of aerial bombings against 
terrorist suspects along the Afghanistan—Pakistan border.  These types of cases 
could be studied in terms of whether the operations were successful in the realm 
of the strategic goals of the campaign even if they failed tactically, and what the 
perceptions of these operations were at the time and what effects those 
perceptions have had on future operations. 
Additionally, there should be a doctrinal review undertaken in order to 
examine more fully the plans and techniques for conducting raids across the 
United States Department of Defense.  Each branch of the service has a concept 
for raiding.  However, it seems unlikely one definition would sufficiently describe 
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all available raiding methods.  There might be much to be learned by comparing 
methods across the services, as well as their measures of success, particularly 
when it comes to the viability of employing these methods and measures of 
success against a terrorist enemy.  
Bruce Hoffman’s work on commando raids, for instance, serves as an 
interesting model to be expanded on in modern times.  His study covered raids 
from 1946 to 1983 and judged them according to his specific principles for 
success.  A study of modern raids from 1989 to the present, assessed against 
the same—or perhaps new—criteria could lead to interesting and surprising 
conclusions about the effectiveness of raids since the end of the cold war. 
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